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Making Appearances Matter:  
Recusal and the Appearance of Bias 
Dmitry Bam 
In the United States, judges are required to recuse themselves—that 
is, remove themselves from participating in a case—not only when they 
are biased, but even when they may appear biased to a neutral observer. 
This nominally strict, appearance-based recusal standard is intended to 
ensure the judge’s impartiality in resolving disputes, to protect the 
judiciary’s reputation, and to instill public confidence in the fairness of 
the courts. It has long been assumed that so long as the judge makes the 
correct recusal decision, the appearance of impartiality is restored and 
the reputation of the judiciary is protected. 
This Article challenges that long-standing assumption and argues 
that the focus on appearances only at the time of the recusal decision, 
when the public has already formed its impressions of judicial 
impartiality, may not fully restore public confidence and protect the 
reputation of the judiciary. In other words, a judge’s recusal decision 
may be too little and come too late. Moreover, when appearances are 
considered on a case-by-case basis, often by the very judge whose 
impartiality has been challenged, even the correct nonrecusal decision 
does not always foster an appearance of impartiality. 
Most of the literature on recusal focuses on the recusal standard and 
the reasons why judges might, intentionally or unintentionally, reach 
the incorrect recusal decision, and seeks solutions to that problem. In this 
Article, I propose a new role that appearances should play in American 
recusal jurisprudence, and a new approach to judicial recusal. I argue 
that rather than allowing individual judges to consider appearances ex 
post (i.e., in the context of individual cases), legislators must consider 
appearances ex ante to prevent the damage to the judiciary from 
arising in the first instance. This means that legislators must regulate 
judicial selection (including judicial elections) and judicial conduct, as 
 
   Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law; J.D. Stanford Law School. I 
want to thank Sarah Cravens, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Amanda Packel, and Deborah Rhode 
for their helpful comments. I am also grateful to a number of participants at the Fourth 
International Legal Ethics Conference for their feedback and critiques. 
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well as extrajudicial conduct, with an eye towards potential future 
recusal. To that end, legislatures should create ethical rules and 
regulations designed to eliminate any appearance of impartiality from 
arising. And, to the extent that recusal cannot be avoided by such ex 
ante regulation, legislatures must also consider appearances ex ante in 
creating and implementing new recusal procedures. 
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 945 
II. JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PAST AND PRESENT ................................ 950 
A. Roots ........................................................................... 951 
B. Judicial Disqualification in the United States ................ 952 
1. Federal recusal statutes .......................................... 953 
2. ABA Codes of Judicial Conduct ............................ 957 
C. Recusal Under the Due Process Clause ........................ 958 
1. Financial interest ................................................... 959 
2. Criminal contempt ................................................ 961 
3. Caperton v. Massey ................................................ 962 
D. Recent Incidents .......................................................... 964 
III. IS GETTING IT RIGHT ENOUGH? ......................................... 966 
A. “Getting to Recusal” .................................................... 969 
B. Why Recusal May Not Be the Solution ......................... 973 
1. Too little, too late ................................................. 973 
2. One case at a time ................................................. 977 
IV. EX ANTE REGULATION AND RECUSAL PROCEDURE ............. 982 
A. Ex Ante Regulation of Judicial Conduct and Judicial 
Elections .................................................................... 982 
1. Judicial elections ................................................... 984 
2. Judicial relationships ............................................. 988 
3. Judicial financial interests ...................................... 990 
4. Extrajudicial involvement ...................................... 991 
B. Recusal Procedures ....................................................... 992 
1. (Non)history of recusal procedure ......................... 994 
2. The importance of procedure ................................ 997 
V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 1003 
 
   
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 1:15 PM 
943 Making Appearances Matter 
 945 
“We may try to see things as objectively as we please. Nonetheless, we 
can never see them with any eyes except our own.” 
—Judge Benjamin Cardozo1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout this nation’s history, Americans have only 
sporadically paid close attention—or any attention—to judicial 
recusal. Recusal, which in certain circumstances requires a judge to 
step aside from hearing a case, is a doctrine that protects (some 
would say is crucial to protecting) both judicial impartiality and the 
appearance of impartiality. That a judge must be disinterested, and 
must appear disinterested, is universally accepted in American legal 
culture. But despite the centrality of that notion in Western legal 
thought, the attention that recusal receives is often short-lived. The 
public temporarily takes notice of the issue when controversy arises, 
and in response to public outcry, state and federal legislatures, state 
supreme courts, and various bar associations promulgate new rules 
and guidelines to govern judicial disqualification or, more often, 
revise the rules already in place.2 The issue then fades from the 
public’s mind and lays quiescent until the cycle is repeated with a 
new high-profile incident. 
But the familiar on-again-off-again pattern has been broken in 
the last few years as recusal has steadily lingered in the national 
spotlight. From the controversy surrounding Justice Scalia’s 
infamous duck-hunting trip with then-litigant Dick Cheney,3 to the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Caperton v. A. T. Massey,4 to the 
more recent outcry over a federal district judge’s decision to 
overturn a federal moratorium on deep-sea drilling in the Deepwater 
 
 1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921). 
 2. The terms “recusal” and “disqualification” are used interchangeably throughout this 
Article. These terms originally had slightly different meanings, with “recusal” referring to 
withdrawal at the judge’s discretion and “disqualification” meaning exclusion by force of law, 
but this distinction is no longer recognized. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In 
Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 45 (1970); see also RICHARD E. 
FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 20.8 
passim (2d ed. 2007). 
 3. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.). 
 4. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). This case is discussed 
in greater detail throughout this Article. The underlying facts in Caperton were the basis for 
John Grisham’s best-selling novel The Appeal. 
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Horizon controversy,5 to the even more recent debate about 
whether a reportedly homosexual federal district court judge should 
have recused himself from ruling on the constitutionality of 
California’s ban on gay marriage,6 judicial recusal has never been 
more in vogue.7 A federal appellate judge once commented that 
recusal is the “topic du jour,” and this was before the spate of recent 
incidents dramatically shook the foundation of the judicial 
disqualification jurisprudence.8 While the aphorism that there is “no 
such thing as bad publicity” may be true in many aspects of modern 
popular culture, this is not the case when it comes to the judiciary. 
As the number of high-profile disqualification controversies 
continues to grow, the reputation of our courts is tarnished, and the 
public’s faith in judicial impartiality and independence erodes. 
There is potentially a silver lining to the cloud of negative 
publicity: as more people notice a problem, and it continues to 
capture their attention, more people tend to work on a solution. 
This has certainly been the case with judicial recusal. The Caperton 
decision has sparked, or at the very least rekindled, academic and 
political interest in judicial disqualification.9 Following on the heels 
 
 5. On June 22, 2010, federal district judge Martin Feldman overturned President 
Obama’s moratorium on deep-ocean oil well drilling. The president had imposed the 
moratorium in response to the disaster in the gulf that spewed millions of barrels of crude oil 
into the Gulf of Mexico each day. It was later discovered that Feldman owns (or owned) 
extensive stock in oil companies and oil drilling corporations, including Allis-Chalmers and 
Exxon, although the stock appears to have been sold the very day that Judge Feldman issued 
his ruling. See Tennille Tracy, Groups Seek Judge’s Removal in Drilling-Moratorium Case, 
WALL ST. J., July 2, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704293604575343361857605650.html. 
 6. See John C. Eastman, Should Judge Have Recused Himself on Prop. 8?, SFGATE.COM 
(Aug. 11, 2010), http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-08-11/opinion/22213940_1_parties-
judge-walker-new-trial. On June 14, 2011, Judge Ware denied the motion to disqualify Judge 
Vaughn Walker. See Howard Mintz, Judge Rejects Bid to Set Aside Proposition 8 Ruling, 
MERCURYNEWS.COM (June 14, 2011, 10:09 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/ 
samesexmarriage/ci_18271537?source=rss&nclick_check. 
 7. While this Article focuses on recusal rules in the United States, recusal has also 
received significant attention overseas. See, e.g., HUGO YOUNG, The Compromising of Lord 
Hoffman, in SUPPING WITH THE DEVILS: POLITICAL WRITING FROM THATCHER TO BLAIR 
212–14 (2003). 
 8. M. Margaret McKeown, Don’t Shoot the Canons: Maintaining the Appearance of 
Propriety Standard, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 45, 45 (2005). 
 9. As of June 21, 2010, a Westlaw search for “Caperton and Massey” yields 172 hits in 
the JLR database. Interestingly, a search of the “ALLFEDS” (all federal cases) and 
“ALLSTATES” (all state cases) yields only 129 results, suggesting that the academic and 
scholarly interest in the case may outweigh its impact on the courts and subsequent litigation. 
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of that decision, Congress held hearings examining judicial recusals 
in light of Caperton,10 states grappled (and continue to grapple) with 
new recusal rules and procedures,11 and law schools around the 
country have held conferences and symposia dedicated to Caperton 
and judicial ethics writ large.12 But despite this concerted effort, no 
large-scale, national disqualification reform looms on the horizon. 
The problem seems to be that while many scholars and judges agree 
that something must be done, few agree on precisely what that 
something should be.13 
There is, however, an overwhelming consensus on one point: 
When it comes to recusal, the focus is generally on the actual recusal 
decision—“What did the judge decide?” and “Was that decision 
correct?” In other words, scholars, judges, and politicians have 
 
This casts some doubt on the Caperton dissenters’ prediction that the decision would open the 
floodgates for “Caperton motions” and that the courts would be inundated with frivolous 
disqualification demands. 
 10. On December 10, 2010, the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on 
Courts and Competition held a hearing entitled “Examining the State of Judicial Recusals after 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey.” This is not the first time in recent years that Congress has paid 
attention to judicial recusal. Shortly after the controversy over Justice Scalia’s non-recusal in a 
case involving Vice President Dick Cheney, Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee 
called for hearings into possible shortcomings of recusal laws that allowed Justice Scalia to hear 
a case after vacationing with one of the litigants. Senator Kerry asserted at the time that 
“[t]here is absolutely no question that when judges accept vacations and gifts from the parties 
before them it erodes public trust in the courts.” Josh Gerstein, Kerry Has Pressed a Long 
Campaign to Rein in Judges, N.Y. SUN, July 14, 2004, at 1. 
 11. West Virginia, Michigan, and Wisconsin are just a few of the states where 
contentious debate regarding the appropriate reaction to Caperton took place. For an article 
summarizing reforms in the states following Caperton, see James Sample, Court Reform Enters 
the Post-Caperton Era, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 787 (2010). On June 27, 2011, New York issued 
new recusal rules for elected state judges, prohibiting those judges from hearing cases involving 
litigants—parties or lawyers—who contributed over $2,500 to their campaigns. See Rules 
Governing the Assignment of Cases Involving Contributors to Judicial Campaigns, RULES OF 
THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS § 151.1, available at 
http://nycourts.gov/rules/chiefadmin/151.shtml#section151_1. 
 12. See, e.g., Symposium, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215 
(2010); Symposium, State Judicial Independence—A National Concern, 33 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 559 (2010); Symposium, Judicial Ethics and Accountability: At Home and Abroad, 42 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2010); Press Release, Georgetown Law School, State Courts and U.S. 
Supreme Court Rulings: Will Caperton and Citizens United Change the Way States Pick 
Judges? (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/ 
January.26.2010.html. 
 13. But see John A. Meiser, Note, The (Non)Problem of a Limited Due Process Right to 
Judicial Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1799 (2009) (suggesting that national-
level reforms to disqualification rules are unnecessary, and that the issue should be left to 
individual states). 
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historically concentrated on what I call “getting to recusal,” that is, 
creating and amending substantive recusal rules that require partial 
judges (whether that partiality is real or perceived) to step aside. And 
even though appearances play an important role in the law of judicial 
recusal, only at the point of the recusal decision are appearances and 
public perception considered. This results-oriented, outcome-based 
approach to recusal is not surprising—the final recusal decision is 
generally the most salient part of the entire recusal process and one 
that figures most prominently in the public spotlight. After all, it was 
recusal decisions themselves that generally gave rise to the recusal-
related controversies arising in the last decade. In turn, the focus on 
outcomes leads recusal reformers to proceed under a fundamentally 
flawed assumption that the problem can be solved by simply 
fashioning a new rule requiring a future judge to recuse under the 
same factual circumstances that may have led a present-day judge not 
to recuse. As a consequence of this assumption, substantive recusal 
standards have been continually revised and refined, while recusal 
procedures have remained stagnant. Additionally, the same 
assumption (i.e., that recusal can eliminate the appearance of 
partiality created by the judicial conduct requiring recusal in the first 
place) has led scholars and politicians to pay little attention to 
regulating the underlying judicial conduct. 
In the pages that follow, I argue that this outcome-based 
approach is misguided when it comes to maximizing the appearance 
of judicial impartiality and judicial legitimacy. Focusing on the final 
recusal decision, and considering appearances only at the time of that 
decision, places too much emphasis on an aspect of recusal that may 
not be so important, at least when it comes to public confidence in 
the impartiality and fairness of American courts. 
This Article recommends a two-part solution. The first part 
requires that attention shift away from the outcome-based recusal 
jurisprudence that focuses on the substantive recusal standard and 
the actual recusal decision. The second requires that attention shift 
toward the rules, regulations, and procedures that precede the 
recusal decision: namely, (1) ex ante regulation of judicial conduct 
and judicial selection that creates the appearance of bias in the first 
place,14 and (2) new recusal procedures to govern the processes by 
 
 14. Unlike ex post solutions like judicial recusal, which seek to minimize the damage to 
the judiciary by removing judges when they may be perceived as biased, an ex ante solution in 
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which judges make recusal decisions. The recommended shift of 
attention to ex ante regulation of judicial conduct and appearance-
based recusal procedures will promote the appearance of judicial 
impartiality.  
While at first glance recusal may seem like a narrow and obscure 
topic within the larger field of judicial ethics and judicial impartiality, 
judicial recusal is a linchpin for the underlying proposition that a 
court should be fair and impartial. Partly as a result of a poorly 
functioning recusal scheme, public confidence in the legal system has 
waned, and people are rightly concerned about the impartiality of 
their courts.15 A “crisis of confidence” may be infecting our ideals of 
judicial impartiality.16 In light of the United States Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White17 and Citizens 
United v. FEC,18 recusal reform may be the best way—perhaps the 
only way—to deal with the appearance of partiality that can be 
created by large campaign contributions to a judge in the course of 
an election.19 As other safeguards of judicial impartiality have fallen 
by the wayside or been struck down by the Supreme Court, and as 
judicial elections have come to resemble legislative elections, finding 
a new approach to recusal becomes more and more crucial. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II discusses the history 
of judicial recusal in the United States. This history shows the 
evolution of American thought about judicial recusal, from its 
common-law origins, when disqualification was required only if the 
judge had a pecuniary interest in the case, to the regime in place 
today, which requires recusal for a mere appearance of bias. I will 
also show how substantive recusal standards have evolved under the  
 
this context consists of rules that minimize or eliminate the damage to the judiciary from 
occurring in the first place. It may seem odd at first glance that in this Article about recusal, 
the key jurisprudential change that I recommend is not actually a change to recusal rules at all, 
but rather a new approach to regulating judges and aspiring judges. Nonetheless, I hope to 
show that to maximize the appearance of impartiality, the time to think about recusal is before 
the appearance of bias arises in the first place. 
 15. Damon M. Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing 
Citizens’ Diffuse Support for State Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 297, 313 (2007). 
 16. John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
237, 245 (1987). 
 17. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 18. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 19. Of course, another solution would be to eliminate judicial elections altogether. 
However, the public strongly supports judicial elections, and eliminating judicial elections at 
this time is politically infeasible. 
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assumption that the substantive recusal rule is the key factor in 
creating the appearance of judicial impartiality. 
Part III starts with the proposition that the public’s perception of 
judicial conduct—the appearance of fairness and partiality—must be 
considered in recusal and disqualification rules and standards. It 
nevertheless concludes that relying solely on the “appearance of bias” 
standard—an ex post standard that has largely been accepted by 
judges and scholars—fails to create an appearance of impartiality. I 
challenge the long-accepted and virtually uncontroverted assumption 
that a judge’s recusal can eliminate the appearance of impartiality. To 
the contrary, I argue that the mere act of recusal is an ineffective way 
to restore the public’s confidence in the courts, in part because it 
comes much too late. Although the empirical data on this issue is 
very limited, some preliminary research suggests that once the public 
has perceived conditions that create impartiality or bias, the recusal 
decision alone cannot fully restore public confidence. Furthermore, I 
argue that making appearance-based recusal decisions in individual 
cases on an ad hoc basis may not create an appearance of impartiality, 
no matter the substantive standard. Both of these conclusions 
require substantially more empirical analysis, but this Article suggests 
that it is a field worth a closer look. 
Part IV proposes a solution: to maximize the appearance of 
impartiality and protect the reputation of the judiciary, we must 
implement ex ante regulations of judicial conduct that prevent the 
need for recusal altogether whenever possible. When recusal cannot 
be avoided, I propose the implementation of systemic, appearance-
based procedural recusal rules. The appearance-based recusal 
procedures are themselves the ends of my proposal, not the means by 
which we accomplish some other goal (namely, the “right” 
substantive result). And while I leave open the question of what 
specific ex ante rules and which particular recusal procedures do the 
most to maximize and restore the appearance of judicial impartiality, 
I conclude with some suggestions about how my proposals could be 
implemented. 
II. JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PAST AND PRESENT 
The American legal system is based on a simple and 
noncontroversial proposition: a fair and neutral judge is essential to 
the operation of a just legal system. This maxim was recognized 
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throughout the history of legal institutions, and, in some respects, 
the academic scholarship on the judiciary, and the judicial role is 
about advancing fair, impartial, and independent judges. 
Disqualification of unfair and non-neutral judges is just one method 
commonly used to ensure impartiality within the judiciary.20 After all, 
judges are human and often develop personal and professional 
relationships that may hinder their ability to preside over a dispute in 
a fair and impartial manner. This Part provides an overview of the 
history and development of recusal rules in the United States. The 
recusal scheme that exists in the United States today has its roots in 
English common law. Exploring the history of recusal rules and 
standards helps explain recent controversies surrounding judicial 
disqualification in state and federal courts. The discussion will also 
highlight the important role that appearances—public perception of 
the judiciary and confidence in the courts—play in current recusal 
jurisprudence. 
A. Roots 
Early Jewish and Roman law recognized the importance of 
judicial impartiality.21 In fact, medieval Jewish law prohibited judges 
from participating in cases involving a friend or a kinsman,22 and the 
Roman Code of Justinian provided for removal of judges for mere 
 
 20. There are, of course, more draconian measures that can be used to remove biased or 
partial judges, including censure, reprimand, and impeachment. Often, these measures are 
reserved for judges who engage in blatant corruption or violate other ethical rules. See, e.g., Ian 
Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 13, 2009, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/ 
13judge.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1300986369-2HIFqUYyJrX5IElf75zRAQ. 
 21. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 5. Bracton set out the common law rule for 
disqualification in the thirteenth century: 
A justiciary may be refused for good cause, but the only cause for refusal is a 
suspicion, which arises from many causes, as if the judge be a blood relative of the 
plaintiff, his vassal or subject, his parent or friend, or an enemy of the tenant, his 
kinsman or a member of his household, or a table-companion, or he has been his 
counsellor or his pleader in that cause or in another, and in any such like capacity. 
6 HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIE 249 (Travers Twiss 
trans., 1883). 
 22. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 5 (citing THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES: BOOK 
FOURTEEN, THE BOOK OF JUDGES 68–70 (Julian Obermann et al. eds., Abraham M. 
Hershman trans., Yale Univ. Press 1949)). The Talmud, dating back to the third century, 
“created strict prohibitions on judges’ interactions with parties.” Jay Hall, Note, The Road Less 
Traveled: The Third Circuit’s Preservation of Judicial Impartiality in an Imperfect World, 50 
VILL. L. REV. 1265, 1268 (2005). 
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suspicion of bias.23 Similarly, English common law provided for 
replacement of a suspect judge and recognized the maxim that “no 
man ought to be a judge in his own cause.”24 But by the 18th 
century, the common-law recusal practice was exceedingly simple 
and highly constrained: only if he had a direct pecuniary interest in 
the case was the judge to be disqualified.25  
Commentators, including Blackstone, and English courts of that 
time rejected the notion that a judge should be disqualified from 
hearing a case merely because he may be biased.26 This was largely 
due to the then-prevalent respect for judges.27 “[T]he law will not 
suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge,” Blackstone wrote, 
“who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose 
authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.”28 
Recusal was not required even when family members appeared as 
parties in front of a judge.29 
B. Judicial Disqualification in the United States 
Under the common law, and in the British Commonwealth even 
to this day, the law on judicial recusal is largely judge-made. In the 
United States, federal and state legislation also play a key role in 
regulating judicial disqualification. This is an important distinction, 
as this Article will later argue that judges are not in the best position 
to regulate their own conduct, whether it comes to recusal 
procedures or to the substantive recusal standard. For now, however, 
let us examine the history and development of the standard. 
 
 23. Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 n.10 (1923). 
 24. Dr. Bonham’s Case, [1610] 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (P.C.); accord Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510, 525 (1927). 
 25. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609–12 (1947). The 
two leading common law authorities for this proposition are the Sir Nicholas Bacon’s Case, 
[1563] 73 Eng. Rep. 487, and the Earl of Derby’s Case, [1614] 77 Eng. Rep. 1390. 
 26. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361; Brookes v. Rivers, [1668] 145 
Eng. Rep. 569 (holding that a judge was not required to recuse himself in his brother-in-law’s 
case). 
 27. Of course, one could argue it was also partly due to a lack of understanding of 
human nature and subconscious bias. See PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, 
PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR 
LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 267–301 (2010) (discussing biases in processing and judging 
information, including hindsight bias, confirmation bias, and overconfidence). 
 28. BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *361. 
 29. Brookes, 145 Eng. Rep. at 569 (explaining that a judge need not recuse himself from 
a brother-in-law’s case because “favour shall not be presumed in a judge”). 
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1. Federal recusal statutes 
Although the American Founders shared some of the English 
reverence for the judiciary, and American disqualification law grew 
directly out of the common law tradition, American judges—at least 
American federal judges—have historically been held to a more 
stringent recusal standard than judges in England.30 Judges continue 
to take an oath swearing to administer justice “faithfully and 
impartially.”31 But in virtually every jurisdiction, financial interest is 
now only one of many disqualifying factors, which also include 
familial and professional connections to the parties or their counsel, 
prejudice, partiality, bias, and knowledge of disputed evidentiary 
facts.32 
Leading up to the American Revolution, colonists adopted the 
simple and narrow common law recusal rule described above. But 
shortly thereafter, in 1792, Congress passed the United States’ first 
recusal statute.33 It is unknown why Congress stepped into the fray 
so quickly, but the passage of the law was perhaps a sign of a concern 
that the recusal issue should not be left entirely to judges. This initial 
legislation was narrowly drawn and interpreted, and did not prohibit 
judges from hearing cases in which they might have a bias for or 
against a party.34 Rather, the statute largely codified the common law 
disqualification rules and called for disqualification of a district court 
judge who was “concerned in interest,” as well as judges who had 
“been of counsel for either party.”35 
 
 30. As I explain in greater detail below, while the substantive recusal standard has 
changed significantly since the common law, and we have a much greater understanding of 
both conscious and subconscious bias, the recusal procedures used in common law are still 
prevalent today. 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006). Each judge and justice of the United States must take the 
following oath:  
“I, _____ _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without 
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will 
faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as 
________________ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help 
me God.” 
 32. See FLAMM, supra note 2, chs. 23–27 (surveying disqualification rules in state and 
federal courts). 
 33. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278–79 (amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1821, 
ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643). 
 34. Id. In other words, Congress did not entirely reject the simple recusal standard that 
was in place in England. 
 35. Id. 
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Over the next two centuries, the federal recusal statute was 
amended and shaped. The federal statute that governs recusals by 
federal judges today is 28 U.S.C. § 455.36 It is divided into two 
parts. Section 455(a) is a general catch-all provision that requires 
disqualification whenever a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.”37 This standard was intended to promote not only the 
impartiality of the judiciary but also the public perception of the 
impartiality of the judicial process.38 No longer do we tolerate all 
non-financial bias by our judges. Instead, the statute is interpreted to 
proscribe even the appearance of bias, as viewed from the perspective 
of an objective observer. 
This appearance-based standard has been in place since the 
statute was amended in 1974 and was intended to overrule the duty-
to-sit doctrine, which suggested that close questions on 
disqualification issues should be resolved in favor of hearing the 
case.39 Section 455(a) has been described by the Court as a 
“catchall” provision, covering all kinds of bias and prejudice, and 
requiring an objective evaluation rather than the earlier subjective 
standard.40 
Section 455(b), on the other hand, lists specific circumstances 
requiring disqualification.41 Some consider the § 455(b) list as an a 
 
 36. This statute is a descendant of the original 1792 statute, which was altered in 1821 
by the Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643; in 1891 by the Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 23, 
§ 21, 36 Stat. 1090; then again in 1911 by the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 
1087, 1090; and recodified as 28 U.S.C. § 455 in 1948. 
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). 
 38. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 5 (1974); see also S. REP. NO. 93-419, at 5 (1973); 
Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (1988) (“The general 
language of subsection (a) was designed to promote public confidence in the integrity of the 
judicial process by replacing the subjective ‘in his opinion’ standard with an objective test.”). 
 39. Mark T. Coberly, Note, Caesar’s Wife Revisited—Judicial Disqualification After the 
1974 Amendments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201, 1205 (1977). 
 40. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994); Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 870–71 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 41. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b). Subsection 455(b)(1) requires a judge to recuse himself when 
he “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed 
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” Id. § 455(b)(1). Subsection (b)(2) requires 
recusal “[w]here in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer 
with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning 
the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning [the matter in 
controversy].” Id. § 455(b)(2). Subsection (b)(3) requires recusal when the judge “has served 
in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material 
witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the 
particular case in controversy.” Id. § 455(b)(3). Subsection (b)(4) demands recusal when the 
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priori, per se determination of conditions that automatically satisfy 
the standard set forth in § 455(a), while others regard the list as a 
predetermined set of circumstances that involve actual bias rather 
than “the public perception of the judicial process.”42 Section 455(b) 
is implicated in cases involving allegations of personal bias or 
prejudice, or when the judge’s relationships and interests—including 
prior employment, family relationships, and financial interests—
create a conflict of interest. In other words, unlike § 455(a), which 
focuses on how a reasonable person would perceive the judicial 
conduct, § 455(b) addresses circumstances that are likely (in the eyes 
of the legislature) to create actual bias towards a party to the 
litigation. 
Despite numerous amendments, each broadening and expanding 
the disqualification standards, judges have always interpreted the 
statute narrowly.43 This is partly because judges apply the law to 
themselves, and most judges hesitate to admit that they are so biased 
or so interested in a case as to be unable to render a fair, impartial 
decision. Research in cognitive psychology has recognized various 
biases that may affect judicial decision making on recusal, including 
unconscious bias and self-serving bias.44 In addition, the judge-
 
judge 
knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in 
his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a 
party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by 
the outcome of the proceeding. 
Id. § 455(b)(4). Finally, subsection (b)(5) requires recusal when a spouse, or close relative, is a 
party in the proceeding or the lawyer to a party in the proceeding, has outside information 
regarding the case in controversy, or stands to gain financially from the case’s outcome. Id. § 
455(b)(5). 
 42. Compare Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Grounds for Judicial Disqualification in 
Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1049–50 (1993) (arguing that § 455(b) particularizes 
the grounds for disqualification that satisfy the catch-all standard of § 455(a)), with Herrington 
v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1502 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Section 455(b) covers 
situations in which an actual conflict of interest exists, even if there is no appearance of one.”) 
(emphasis omitted); see also Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527 (11th Cir. 
1988). 
 43. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial 
Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 540–41 (2005). 
 44. Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a 
Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913 (1999) 
(discussing unconscious bias); see also Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A 
Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 143–80 (2000) 
(discussing self-serving bias). 
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created “duty to sit” doctrine encouraged judges to err on the side 
of remaining on a case even when there was a strong argument in 
favor of recusal.45 
Judicial reluctance to acknowledge bias is only part of the reason 
why federal recusal statutes have had only limited success. Bias is a 
difficult concept to define. Generally, bias is defined as an 
“[i]nclination; prejudice, predilection; a preconceived opinion; a 
predisposition to decide a cause or an issue in a certain way, which 
does not leave the mind perfectly open to conviction.”46 
Unfortunately, the attempts to draw bright lines for judges to follow 
have focused predominantly on judges’ financial interests at the 
expense of all other interests.47 In fact, the disclosures required of all 
federal judges address only financial holdings.48 The focus on 
financial interests is understandable since financial interests are 
generally easier to define and identify. Furthermore, the popularity 
of law and economics—which claims that wealth maximization 
motivates human behavior—shifts the emphasis even more to a 
judge’s financial ties.  
A second recusal statute, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 144, allows 
litigants to seek disqualification of a district court judge for any 
alleged bias or prejudice and establishes a broader recusal standard. 
Under this statute, judges have limited discretion about whether to 
recuse; litigants need only file an affidavit alleging sufficient facts to 
infer a judge’s prejudice.49 Once such an affidavit is filed, the facts 
contained in the affidavit are presumptively valid, and a judge is 
automatically disqualified from the case.50 In Berger v. United States, 
the Supreme Court explained that this statute prohibits a judge from  
 
 
 
 45. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (emphasis omitted). 
 46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 171 (9th ed. 2009). 
 47. A judge must recuse himself when “[h]e knows that he, individually or as a 
fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the 
subject matter in controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000). Financial interest is defined as 
“ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small” Id.  § 455(d)(4). 
 48. See Ethics in Government Act, §§ 101–102, 5 U.S.C. app. 4 (2000); see also Richard 
Carelli, Judges’ Financial Reports Hit Web, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 22, 2000. 
 49. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921). 
 50. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 25.2.1, at 721 (“On its face § 144 appears to be a 
peremptory disqualification provision, and there is little doubt that it was originally intended to 
be one.”).  
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ruling on the truth of the allegations in a party’s affidavit, requiring 
disqualification so long as the affidavit is facially sufficient.51 
However, judges have adopted a narrow definition of prejudice 
and continue to review the affidavit to determine whether the 
litigants have satisfied the statutory requirements.52 In other words, 
the very judge whose fairness is under review rules on the sufficiency 
of the affidavit. Professor Frank has explained: 
Frequent escape from the statute has been effected through narrow 
construction of the phrase “bias and prejudice.” Affidavits are 
found not “legally sufficient” on the ground that the specific acts 
mentioned do not in fact indicate “bias and prejudice,” a reasoning 
which emasculates the Berger decision by transferring the point of 
conflict.53 
2. ABA Code of Judicial Conduct 
While 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144 control only in federal courts,54 
nearly every state has adopted the American Bar Association’s Code of 
Judicial Conduct.55 The Code, therefore, governs judicial 
 
 51. 255 U.S. at 36. 
 52. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts, 87 IOWA L. 
REV. 1213, 1224 (2002). 
 53. Frank, supra note 25, at 629. Countervailing a judge’s duty to recuse was a 
judicially created “duty to sit,” first articulated by the Fifth Circuit. Edwards v. United States, 
334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964). That court explained that “[i]t is a judge’s duty to 
refuse to sit when he is disqualified but it is equally his duty to sit when there is no valid reason 
for recusation.” Id. The “duty to sit” provided the ammunition for judges to err on the side of 
nonrecusal, even when recusal was arguably justified. Although the duty to sit doctrine was 
eventually accepted by all circuits, see Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972), the duty to 
sit has now largely been rejected. 
 54. The Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to the Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court, although the Supreme Court looks to the Code for guidance. See Caprice L. 
Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last 
Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 111 (2004). In light of recent controversies surrounding 
recusal of Supreme Court Justices, including Justices Scalia and Thomas, some commentators 
and law professors have called on the Court to adopt the Code for itself or for Congress to 
impose such adoption upon the Court. 
 55. The original Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted in 1924 by the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar Association and ultimately by a majority of the states over the 
course of the next five decades. The House of Delegates adopted more explicit standards for 
judicial conduct in 1972 and ultimately adopted a revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 
1990. That Code was superseded by a revised Code adopted in February 2007 by the ABA 
House of Delegates. The 2007 revision is available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ 
ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf. 
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disqualification in almost all American state courts56 and applies to all 
full-time judges and all legal and quasi-legal proceedings.57 
Rule 2.11 of the 2007 Code states: “A judge shall disqualify 
himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned . . . .”58 Impartiality is defined as the 
“absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties 
or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in 
considering issues that may come before the judge.”59 In many ways, 
disqualification under the Code resembles disqualification under 28 
U.S.C. § 455(a): both have been interpreted to impose an 
appearance-based disqualification standard.60 Both also leave judges 
with broad discretion in interpreting and applying this standard, and 
judges have exploited this discretion to downplay the potential for an 
appearance of bias.61 I discuss disqualification of state and federal 
judges interchangeably, as any distinctions between the two are 
generally inapposite for the purposes of this Article. 
C. Recusal Under the Due Process Clause 
In addition to the federal statutes and the state judicial codes, the 
Constitution’s Due Process Clause guarantees litigants a right to 
have their cases heard and decided by fair and impartial judges.62 The 
Supreme Court has held that a biased judge violates the litigant’s 
constitutional rights, requiring either a new trial or a new hearing on 
 
 56. Forty-nine states have adopted the Code in one form or another. Leslie W. 
Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might 
Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000). 
 57. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges is another ethical code that applies 
to most federal judges and is largely similar to the ABA Model Code. The Code, adopted and 
revised by the Judicial Conference of the United States, does not govern the Justices of the 
United States Supreme Court because the Conference has no authority to create rules 
controlling the Supreme Court. See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. 
Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375, 386 (2006). 
 58. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 2.11 (2007). The rule goes on to list 
specific situations where the likelihood of prejudice or its appearance is presumed, although the 
list is not exhaustive. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Abramson, supra note 56, at 55 n.2 (“Whether a judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned is also referred to as the appearance of partiality, appearance of 
impropriety, or negative appearances.”). 
 61. Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 680 
(2005). 
 62. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
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appeal without the tainted judge’s presence.63 These holdings, 
however, are exceptions rather than the rule, and it has long been 
thought that the Constitution mandates disqualification in only very 
limited circumstances. The Supreme Court has explained that 
“matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest 
would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion” 
rather than a constitutional recusal floor.64 For decades, it was 
thought that recusal was mandated under the Due Process Clause in 
only two circumstances: (1) when the judge has a financial interest in 
one of the parties; or (2) when the judge presides over a criminal 
contempt hearing after presiding over an earlier hearing in which the 
contemptuous behavior took place. But in Caperton, the Supreme 
Court held that recusal is also mandated when the judge’s 
relationship with one of the litigants creates a probability of bias.65 
Although Caperton involved a judge who decided a case involving a 
supporter of the judge’s election bid, the holding of the case does 
not appear to be limited to the electoral context.66 Nonetheless, it 
remains to be seen whether Caperton will change recusal analysis 
under the Due Process Clause, or if it will be a one-off case limited 
to its facts. These three categories of recusal—the two classic 
standards, and the new Caperton standard—are discussed in greater 
detail below. 
1. Financial interest 
The first situation where the Due Process Clause requires 
disqualification is when the judge may benefit financially depending 
on the outcome of the case. In the leading case, Tumey v. State of 
Ohio, an Ohio statute authorized a mayor to preside over cases as a 
judge.67 The mayor then received court costs assessed against a 
convicted defendant, but not an acquitted one. The Court held that 
this incentive scheme threatened judicial impartiality and invalidated 
the statute on due process grounds, explaining that due process is 
 
 63. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process.”). 
 64. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (citing Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 
266, 270 (1884)). 
 65.  Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 66.  See id. at 2257, 2267. 
 67. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 510. 
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violated when a judge is “paid for his service only when he convicts 
the defendant.”68 In its holding, the Court relied on the common 
law rule that a judge may not have a “direct, personal, substantial 
pecuniary interest” in the case.69 That rule has its origins in the 
maxim that no person is allowed to be “a judge in his own cause, 
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and . . . 
corrupt his integrity.”70 This result is neither controversial nor 
surprising; a judge should not receive “contingency fees” for 
convicting a defendant.71 
A judge’s interest need not be a direct financial one to violate 
due process. For example, in Ward v. Village of Monroeville the 
Court held that a mayor could not preside as a judge over ordinance 
violations and traffic offenses when contributions to the town’s 
budget came from the fines assessed by the court.72 While the 
mayor’s salary did not depend on his conviction rate, the mayor still 
had a financial incentive to convict; he was responsible for the town’s 
revenue production. That incentive, held the Court, is inconsistent 
with due process.73 
Similar incentives were held to violate due process in Aetna Life 
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie.74 There, an Alabama Supreme Court justice 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff on his bad faith claim against Aetna. It 
turned out, however, that the same judge had filed two nearly 
identical actions against other insurance companies making similar 
allegations and seeking punitive damages.75 Those cases were still 
pending in Alabama’s lower courts at the time the Aetna case was 
decided. The Supreme Court held that the justice’s refusal to recuse 
violated the Due Process Clause. Without deciding whether the 
justice was in fact influenced by his pending cases, the Court 
explained that the circumstances “would offer a possible temptation 
 
 68. Id. at 531. 
 69. Id. at 523. 
 70. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 71. Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 249 (2010). 
 72. 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). Between 1964 and 1968, the fines, forfeitures, costs, and 
fees that the court had imposed provided nearly one-half of the village’s annual revenue. Id. at 
58. 
 73. Id. at 60 (“The mayor’s executive responsibilities [sic] for village finances may make 
him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor’s court.”). 
 74. 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986). 
 75. Id. at 817. 
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to the average judge to lead him to not to [sic] hold the balance 
nice, clear and true.”76 In other words, recusal was necessary not 
because of the justice’s ill will towards insurance companies, but 
rather because his decision “had the clear and immediate effect of 
enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value of his own 
case.”77 As with Tumey and Ward, the judge could have used his 
position on the bench to further his own financial interests, acting as 
“a judge in his own case.”78 
In short, before Caperton, the “interested judge” category was 
fairly straightforward: if the judge could be linked to any financial 
interest, disqualification was required. The common thread in all of 
these cases was that the presiding judge derived a direct or indirect 
benefit by ruling in favor of one of the litigants. 
2. Criminal contempt 
 The second disqualification category that falls within the confines 
of the Due Process Clause does not involve any financial interest to 
the judge. Instead, the Court has held that the due process forbids a 
judge from wearing too many hats. For example, in In re Murchison, 
the Court found a violation of the Due Process Clause although the 
judge did not have a personal pecuniary interest in the outcome of 
the case.79 There, the Court set aside contempt convictions and held 
that it is a violation of due process for the same judge to serve as the 
one-person grand jury and then preside over a contempt proceeding 
related to the grand jury hearing.80 
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, which followed In re Murchison, is also 
instructive.81 In Mayberry, the defendant, in the course of trial, 
verbally attacked the presiding judge82 and continuously interrupted 
court, to the point where Mayberry had to be removed from the 
 
 76. Id. at 825 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)). 
 77. Id. at 824. 
 78. Id.; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (holding that an 
administrative board made up of optometrists was disqualified from presiding over a hearing 
against competing optometrists). 
 79. 349 U.S. 133 (1955). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971). 
 82. Defendant referred to the judge as a “hatchet man for the State,” a “dirty 
sonofabitch,” and a “dirty, tyrannical old dog.” Id. at 456–57. 
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courtroom.83 The Supreme Court held that when the defendant 
faces criminal contempt charges he “should be given a public trial 
before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor.”84 
Again, disqualification was necessary because of the interaction 
between the judge and the defendant prior to the contempt 
hearing.85 The Court explained that a “vilified” judge “necessarily 
becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy. No one so 
cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary 
for fair adjudication.”86 
3. Caperton v. Massey 
This was the state of recusal law under the Due Process Clause 
until Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.87 In that case, West Virginia 
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote in favor of 
the appellant, Massey, whose CEO, Don Blankenship, was an 
extremely generous supporter of Justice Benjamin in the previous 
West Virginia Supreme Court election campaign. Blankenship 
contributed more to Benjamin’s campaign than all other donors 
combined, all while his attorneys were preparing the Caperton case 
for an appeal.88 Justice Benjamin refused Caperton’s recusal request 
and voted with the majority in a three–two decision overturning the 
trial court’s verdict.89 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
 
 83. Id. at 462. 
 84. Id. at 466. The same rule applies when a trial judge, following trial, punishes a 
lawyer for contempt committed during trial without giving that lawyer an opportunity to be 
heard in defense or mitigation. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 499–500 (1974). In such 
circumstances, a different judge should conduct the contempt trial in place of the judge who 
initiated the contempt. 
 85. Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 465. 
 86. Id. 
 87. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 88. During the campaign Blankenship spent approximately $3 million to help Justice 
Benjamin. However, only $1000, the West Virginia limit for direct campaign contributions, 
was given directly to Benjamin’s campaign. The rest of the money (i) funded a tax-exempt 
organization, And for the Sake of the Kids, which was formed to defeat incumbent Justice 
McGraw, and (ii) was spent on newspaper and television advertising attacking McGraw. See 
Brief for Petitioners at 6–8, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 
08-22). 
 89. Id. at 2. The case’s long history and factual background is not relevant for the 
purposes of this Article. It should be noted, however, that recusal played a prominent role in 
the case’s procedural history. After Benjamin cast the deciding vote in the original appeal, 
Blankenship’s relationship with yet another justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court drew 
substantial public attention when photographs surfaced showing Blankenship and Justice 
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Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse violated Caperton’s right to due 
process.  
After Caperton, there is little doubt that recusal is required under 
the Due Process Clause even when the judge has no personal interest 
in the outcome of the litigation and did not act as both a judge and a 
prosecutor or witness in the same case. It remains to be seen, 
however, whether this case is a trendsetter and will change the way 
that states approach judicial recusal, or if it is simply an outlier that 
will have limited jurisprudential effect. Some have suggested that the 
Caperton holding is fairly narrow, requiring a judge to recuse 
“himself because of campaign contributions or independent 
expenditures by an individual who is not a lawyer or party before the 
Court but has an interest in a case that is before the court.”90 And 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion takes great pains to convey the 
limited precedential effect of the Court’s decision. The opinion 
describes the situation as “exceptional” and “extreme;”91 so 
exceptional, in fact, that “[a]pplication of the constitutional standard 
implicated in this case will thus be confined to rare instances.”92  
But there is no reason to believe that the decision is limited 
solely to the campaign contribution context. Rather, the Caperton 
test may be satisfied, and disqualification may be required, even 
outside the universe of judicial elections and campaign contributions. 
For example, the Court accepted the notion that Justice Benjamin 
“would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his 
extraordinary efforts to get him elected.”93 There is nothing in that 
notion—the idea of a debt of gratitude—that is limited to judicial 
elections. Would a federal judge feel a debt of gratitude to the 
president who selected her? Or perhaps to the judge’s former 
colleague at a large law firm who helped the judge in some life 
endeavor? How the lower courts interpret the Supreme Court’s  
 
 
Elliott Maynard vacationing together on the French Riviera. John Gibeaut, Caperton’s Coal: 
The Battle over an Appalachian Mine Exposes a Nasty Vein in Bench Politics, 95 A.B.A. J. 52, 56 
(2009). As a result of the controversy, Justice Maynard recused himself from the case. Id. At 
around the same time, Justice Larry Starcher, a critic of Massey and Blankenship, also recused 
himself from the case. Id. 
 90. Rotunda, supra note 711, at 256. 
 91. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263, 2265, 2267. 
 92. Id. at 2267. 
 93. Id. at 2262. 
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decision in Caperton will be one of the most important trends to 
follow in the area of judicial ethics. 
D. Recent Incidents 
Recusal has garnered national headlines on many occasions over 
the last few decades. Judges have been denied appointments to the 
Supreme Court,94 suspended,95 and have faced other sanctions and 
general opprobrium for their recusal-related misconduct.96 But in the 
last decade alone, five current Supreme Court Justices—Justice 
Scalia, along with Justices Thomas,97 Ginsburg,98 Roberts,99 and 
 
 94. When President Nixon nominated Judge Clement Haynsworth to the United States 
Supreme Court, his failure to recuse ultimately led to his nomination being defeated. First, 
Haynsworth’s opponents pointed out that he sat on an important labor case involving the 
Deering Milliken Darlington Manufacturing Company while owning stock in a vending 
company that installed and serviced vending machines in the Deering plants. See Peter W. 
Bowie, The Last 100 Years: An Era of Expanding Appearances, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 911, 929–30 
(2007). The Senate Judiciary Committee closely scrutinized Judge Haynsworth’s interest in 
the vending company and its relations with Deering. Id. at 930. Later, it was learned that 
Haynsworth purchased stock in the Brunswick Corporation while a case involving Brunswick 
was under submission, after oral argument and before the draft decision was circulated. Frank, 
supra note 2, at 56. Haynsworth did not recuse himself. In large part due to his improper 
conduct on the bench and failure to recuse himself in the Deering and Brunswick cases, 
Haynsworth’s nomination was denied by the Senate. See Bowie, supra, at 930. 
 95. For example, the Tenth Circuit suspended District Judge Stephen Chandler from all 
judicial duties after he refused to recuse himself in two cases. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 
U.S. 74 (1970). 
 96. See generally JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 236–252  
(1974); Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code: 
The Parting of Ways, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 271 (2007). 
 97. Justice Thomas’s wife, Virginia Thomas, is alleged to have ties to the Tea Party and 
has been active in conservative politics. Recently, House Democrats called for Justice Thomas 
to recuse himself from hearing any challenge to the constitutionality of the Affordable Care 
Act. See Huma Khan, Should Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas, Elena Kagan Sit Out 
Health Care Case?, ABC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2011, 3:01 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Politics/supreme-court-justice-clarence-thomas-sit-health-care/stor y?id=12878346. 
 98. The controversy stemmed from her involvement with the National Organization of 
Women Legal Defense and Education Fund. In light of her involvement, thirteen Republican 
Congressmen demanded that Justice Ginsburg recuse herself from all future abortion cases. 
GOP Lawmakers Ask Ginsburg to Withdraw from Abortion Cases, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2004, 
at A15. 
 99. Justice Roberts was questioned about his continued involvement in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld after he was approached about a potential nomination to the United States Supreme 
Court. The case was considered to be important to the President, and some scholars have 
commented that Roberts should have recused himself from Hamdan after he learned that he 
was being considered for the nomination to the Supreme Court. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The 
Propriety of a Judge’s Failure to Recuse When Being Considered for Another Position, 19 GEO. J. 
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Alito100—have been embroiled in recusal-related controversies. 
Justice Scalia’s denial of plaintiffs’ recusal request in Cheney v. United 
States District Court is perhaps the most controversial incident in the 
last decade.101 In the underlying action, plaintiffs sought discovery 
regarding an Energy Advisory Panel that was convened by then-Vice 
President Dick Cheney. When the issue reached the Supreme Court, 
one of the plaintiffs asked Justice Scalia to recuse himself because 
while the appeal was pending, Scalia and Cheney took a duck-
hunting trip together. Justice Scalia denied the recusal motion, 
concluding that his impartiality could not reasonably be 
questioned.102 
Even before the Supreme Court’s Caperton decision, Judge 
McKeown called judicial recusal the “topic du jour.”103 But despite 
all this controversy, “the theoretical underpinnings of American 
judicial disqualification jurisprudence remain murky, . . . 
unsettled, . . . and replete with inconsistencies.”104 Recusal experts 
have commented that “judicial disqualification frequently is 
subjective, random, and arbitrary,”105 and that “disqualification law is 
a sprawling patchwork, as thin as it is wide.”106 Although judicial bias 
and recusal have always been issues of considerable importance, 
recusal has recently taken on an even greater significance that 
demands immediate scholarly attention. As judicial elections become 
“noisier, nastier and costlier,” recusal becomes more and more 
important to minimize the judicial bias created in the course of 
judicial elections.107 
 
LEGAL ETHICS 1187 (2006). 
 100. While he was a judge on the Third Circuit, Justice Alito sat on a case in which 
Vanguard, a mutual fund management firm in which he had invested, was a party. Judge Alito 
wrote the opinion affirming dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim. R. Jeffrey Smith, Judge 
Participated in 2002 Vanguard Case Despite Promise to Recuse, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/31/AR20051031016 
86.html 
 101. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.). 
 102. Id. at 929. 
 103. McKeown, supra note 8, at 45. 
 104. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.6, at 14. 
 105. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 4–5 (1995). 
 106. Deborah Goldberg et al., The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal 
Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 517–18 (2007). 
 107. Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the 
Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 76 (1985). 
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This transformation of judicial elections is no minor point. The 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White108 and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission109 are 
part of the recent trend that has seen judicial elections come to 
resemble legislative elections. Over 70 percent of Americans believe 
that judges receiving campaign contributions are not impartial in 
litigation involving those contributors,110 and numerous empirical 
studies demonstrate that judges tend to rule in favor of their 
campaign contributors.111 Even judges do not believe that their 
colleagues can be impartial when dealing with those who helped 
them get elected.112 In this legal environment, recusal is necessary to 
ensure that bias stemming from judicial campaign contributions and 
judicial elections is minimized. In fact, judicial recusal may be the 
only way to deal with the appearances of partiality created when 
judges accept contributions from lawyers and persons who ultimately 
appear as litigants in front of the judge. 
III. IS GETTING IT RIGHT ENOUGH? 
As the discussion above shows, most jurisdictions in the United 
States have implemented recusal standards that revolve primarily 
around the appearance of impartiality. That is, in determining 
whether a judge should be disqualified from hearing a case, the 
challenged judge’s actual state of mind is largely irrelevant; the 
 
 108. 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (striking down a Minnesota judicial canon that 
prohibited candidates for judicial office from announcing their views on legal issues). 
 109. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (holding that federal restrictions on corporate 
independent expenditures and electioneering communications are unconstitutional). 
 110. See GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE 
FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 4 (2001), available at http://www.gqrr.com/articles/1617/ 
1412_JAS_ntlsurvey.pdf; ZOGBY INT’L FOR THE JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, MARCH 2004 
SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS: AMERICANS SPEAK ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2004), available at 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/usprograms/focus/transparency/articles_publications/publ
ications/justiceatstake_20040506/c_zogby_summary.pdf; see also David E. Pozen, The Irony 
of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 305 (2008). 
 111. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 623 
(2009) (finding a “strong relationship between campaign contributions and judges’ rulings” 
and demonstrating that elected judges “routinely adjust their rulings to attract votes and 
campaign money”); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of 
Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2002); Margaret S. Williams & 
Corey A. Ditslear, Bidding for Justice: The Influence of Attorneys’ Contributions on State 
Supreme Courts, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 135, 136 (2007). 
 112. Pozen,  supra note 110, at 305. 
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recusal decision hinges on the perceptions of “a reasonable person 
knowing all the relevant facts.”113 This standard is intended “to 
protect the . . . appearance of impartiality.”114 Of course, recusal is 
also required in the event the judge is actually biased, but rarely does 
a disqualification inquiry turn on a judge’s actual bias.115 Cases of 
actual bias are rare, in part because an “affirmative finding of actual 
bias requires direct evidence or a very strong inference that the judge 
was so predisposed against a party that he or she had an entirely 
closed mind.”116 Indeed, the appearance-of-bias test came into 
existence to address the problems inherent in a disqualification rule 
that either requires the litigant to show that the judge is “actually 
biased” or demands that the judge so conclude on her own. While 
some scholars and judges have criticized the appearance-based 
substantive recusal standard, few people dispute that appearances are 
important to the American judiciary and are a valid, if not a 
compelling, consideration in setting rules to govern judicial  
disqualification.117 Alexander Hamilton observed that the judicial 
 
 113. Roberts v. Bilar, 625 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 114. United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 115. In Caperton, the Supreme Court held that a judge must recuse himself when there is 
a probability of actual bias. I have previously argued that the probability-based rule announced 
in Caperton is different and distinct from the appearance-based rule contained in the federal 
recusal statute and the state judicial codes. See generally Dmitry Bam, Understanding Caperton: 
Judicial Disqualification Under the Due Process Clause, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 65 (2010). 
Others, including Justice Ginsburg, disagree. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–35, 
Caperton v. A.T Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22), available at http:// 
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-22.pdf (“I was taking 
appearance, likelihood, probability as all synonyms . . . .”); cf. Gerard J. Clark, Caperton’s New 
Right to Independence in Judges, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 707 (2010) (“The Court’s due 
process standard, however, is really no different than the standards in recusal statutes and 
judicial codes.”); Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, 
Mandatory Recusal and Due Process, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 359,  370 (2009) (discussing the 
terms “appearance,” “perception,” and “probability” and treating  them as synonymous); 
 116. GRANT HAMMOND, JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS 17 
(2008). 
 117. For criticism, see Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, 
and the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1340–41 (2006) 
(arguing that appearance-based standards for judicial conduct are too vague to protect the 
judiciary); Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety: What 
the Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914 (2010). Despite the fact that 
both authors criticize the “appearance of impropriety” standard, neither appears to question 
that appearances themselves are important for a successful and well-functioning judiciary. My 
proposal in this Article gets around many of the problems identified by Rotunda and McKoski 
by taking the appearance inquiry out of the hands of individual judges and allowing 
appearances to be considered ex ante, only in implementing rules of judicial conduct and 
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branch has “no influence, over either the sword or the purse.”118  
Policymakers today appreciate that judges lack both electoral 
legitimacy and political force, making the judiciary’s success depend 
in large part on the public’s acceptance of its authority.119 Without 
such acceptance, a judicial proclamation carries no weight, and court 
rulings are routinely ignored.120 If the public lacks confidence in the 
impartiality of judges, or worse, refuses to comply with judicial 
decisions voluntarily, the notion that “we are a government of laws” 
would necessarily collapse. If for no other reason, courts should be 
protective of their reputation from public outrage and rejection for 
the sake of self-preservation.121  
Just as policymakers recognize the importance of appearances 
and public perception in setting recusal standards, judges 
acknowledge that the success of the judiciary hinges in large part on 
public confidence—the people’s faith—in the impartiality, 
independence, and accountability of the judiciary. Justice John Paul 
Stevens once said, “[i]t is confidence in the men and women who 
administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of 
law.”122 The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of 
appearances, stating that “our system of law has always endeavored 
to prevent even the probability of unfairness” and that “to perform 
its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance 
of justice.’”123 Appearance of fairness, in other words, is as important 
as fairness itself.124 Thus, in considering the effectiveness of a recusal 
scheme, impartiality is only part of the equation; appearance of 
impartiality and appearance of justice are perhaps just as important.125 
 
recusal procedures. 
 118. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 119. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
 120. MACKENZIE, supra note 96, at ix. There are many nations where judges’ rulings are 
routinely ignored and many others where the judiciary is held in disrepute because of its lack of 
independence, rampant corruption, or other forces. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s authority—
possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence 
in its moral sanction.”). 
 123. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 
U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). 
 124. Ex parte Bryant, 682 So. 2d 39, 41 (Ala. 1996). 
 125. Cf. Randall J. Litteneker, Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or 
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But even if one starts with the assumption that appearances 
should continue to play a key role in recusal jurisprudence, we must 
still ask how and when appearances should be considered, what role 
public perception should play, and whether certain rules indeed 
foster the public’s confidence in the judiciary or, to the contrary, 
impede it. This is where current recusal jurisprudence goes astray. 
Despite my enthusiastic support for the consideration of appearances 
in judicial disqualification jurisprudence, I argue that scholars writing 
about recusal, as well as politicians and bar associations setting 
recusal rules and judges enforcing those rules, have paid undue 
attention to the substantive recusal standard at the expense of other 
rules and standards that may actually be more important when it 
comes to maximizing the appearance of impartiality.  
A. “Getting to Recusal” 
Today, the entire “appearance” inquiry takes place at one 
discrete point of a recusal timeline: the time when the actual recusal 
decision is made. It is only then that the appearance-of-bias test is 
triggered, and only then that anybody—usually the very judge whose 
continued presence on the case is being questioned—considers the 
potential effect on public perception if the challenged judge 
continues to preside over, or casts a vote in, the case. The timing is 
generally not viewed as a problem because of the widely accepted 
assumption that if the judge makes the correct recusal decision, 
public confidence in the judiciary will be restored. In other words, so 
long as the judge reaches a “correct” recusal decision, law essentially 
operates on the well-established playground basketball principle of 
“no harm, no foul.” Under this assumption, postponing 
consideration of appearances until this late juncture makes perfect 
sense.  
Operating under this assumption, policymakers (when it comes 
to recusal, the policymakers are usually legislators, bar associations, 
or state supreme courts) have focused almost entirely on the 
substantive recusal standard, amending it when controversies arise 
and defining more precisely the circumstances that should lead to 
recusal.126 For example, at the federal level, when Congress decides 
 
Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236, 267 (1978) (identifying the importance of “a judicial 
system that not only is impartial in fact, but also appears to render disinterested justice”). 
 126. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006) (providing that federal judges are disqualified in 
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to amend the judicial disqualification statute, it almost always 
“enlarge[s] the enumerated grounds for seeking disqualification.”127 
The focus on the substantive standard has led to what some 
commentators have termed a “vicious cycle.”128 Describing the 
holding pattern in the development of judicial disqualification 
doctrine in the United States, Amanda Frost wrote: 
First, Congress sets the standard governing when judges must 
remove themselves from sitting on cases in which they are not able, 
or might not be able, to be impartial. That standard is then 
narrowly construed by the judges who must apply it to decide 
whether they themselves should be disqualified from a case. 
Eventually, a particularly egregious situation arises in which a judge 
sits on a case when most outside observers think that she should 
have stepped aside. The situation comes to the attention of the 
press, the public, and ultimately Congress, which amends the law 
to provide stiffer standards for recusal. And then the whole process 
begins anew.129 
But it is not only politicians and bar leaders who operate under 
this assumption. Most of the scholarship in the field has focused on 
what I call “getting to recusal”—that is, seeking solutions that will 
lead to the “correct” substantive recusal decision, assuming, once 
again, that if judges can reach such a decision, recusal will do its job. 
In discussing recusal, scholars generally pay insufficient attention to 
preventing the underlying event or conduct from occurring. 
Much of the normative recusal scholarship falls into one of two 
broad categories.130 The first focuses on the substantive recusal 
standard itself. Some authors argue that the appearance-based recusal 
standard is misguided and should be changed.131 For example, Sarah 
Cravens suggests that the main goal of judicial ethics is to achieve 
not the appearance of justice but rather actual justice in judicial 
decision making.132 She argues that impartiality concerns should be 
 
certain narrowly drawn scenarios). 
 127. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 23.1, at 670. 
 128. Leubsdorf, supra note 16, at 245. 
 129. Frost, supra note 43, at 538. 
 130. There is of course a great deal of descriptive scholarship looking at the history and 
evolution of judicial recusals, describing trends in judicial disqualification jurisprudence, and 
discussing the implications of particular recusal decisions. 
 131. Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 132. Id. 
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addressed not through recusal standards that focus on appearance, 
but rather “through a requirement that judges provide explanations 
of adequate internal legal reasons supporting their dispositive 
decisions.”133 Others defend the standard against these attacks, 
arguing that appearances should continue to play an important or 
even greater role in the substantive recusal standard.134 Both camps, 
however, focus on the actual recusal decision; their disagreement is 
only about the standard that should be applied. They both mirror 
the approach that Congress has taken, tinkering with the substantive 
recusal standards and amending judicial disqualification statutes. 
The second, larger category of recusal-related scholarship 
involves attempts by academics to identify the facts and 
circumstances that should lead to disqualification under the current, 
appearance-based standard.135 Here, again, the focus is on the recusal 
decision, but this time the effort is not to formulate the best 
substantive standard but rather to determine when recusal is 
necessary in the current scheme. For example, in a recent article, 
Keith Swisher argues that judges taking a “tough on crime” stance in 
the course of judicial elections should be disqualified under the 
current appearance-based recusal standard because their impartiality 
may reasonably be questioned.136 Others have argued for additional 
guidance and inclusion of specific, clear, bright-line substantive rules 
that would aid the court in deciding whether refusal to recuse would 
create an appearance of impropriety.137 
The assumption that a stringent recusal standard can negate the 
damage to appearances, and reinforce the appearance of judicial 
impartiality, also motivates judges. Concurring in White, which 
struck down a provision in Minnesota’s code of judicial ethics that 
prohibited judicial election candidates from discussing political issues 
and announcing their positions on those issues, Justice Kennedy 
 
 133. Id. at 2. 
 134. Bassett, supra note 52; Frank, supra note 25; Jed Handelsman Shugerman, In 
Defense of Appearances: What Caperton v. Massey Should Have Said, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 529 
(2010); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense Through 
Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal, 29 REV. LITIG. 249 (2010); 
Brian P. Leitch, Note, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts: A Proposal to Conform 
Statutory Provisions to Underlying Policies, 67 IOWA L. REV. 525 (1982). 
 135. See Abramson, supra note 56; Abramson, supra note 42. 
 136. Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe for 
Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (2010). 
 137. Abramson, supra note 42, at 1080. 
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explained that states “may adopt recusal standards more rigorous 
than due process requires, and censure judges who violate these 
standards.”138 In other words, according to Justice Kennedy, the way 
to create and foster an appearance of a fair and impartial judiciary is 
by tightening the recusal framework, not by regulating the judicial 
conduct that creates the appearance in the first place.  
The same reasoning continued in Caperton, where Justice 
Kennedy, this time writing for the Court, said that the “appearance 
of impropriety” standard is “[t]he principal safeguard against judicial 
campaign abuses’ that threaten to imperil ‘public confidence in the 
fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges.”139 Again, any 
damage to the public confidence in the impartiality and fairness of 
the courts is to be remedied by imposing a strict recusal standard 
requiring disqualification of judges for even an appearance of bias.140 
The following chart (Figure 1) provides a visual illustration of 
the “getting to recusal” approach. It shows the four possible recusal 
decisions that a judge may reach. There are two correct decisions: a 
judge may recuse when there is appearance of partiality, and non-
recuse when there is no appearance of impartiality. There are also 
two incorrect decisions: a judge may recuse when there is no 
appearance of partiality, and a judge may decide not to recuse when 
there is such an appearance. Under the traditional “getting to 
recusal” framework, the focus has generally been on getting the 
judge out of the two “wrong” boxes141 and into the two “right” 
ones. This Article argues that simply getting it right is not enough to 
create an appearance of impartiality. 
 
 
 138. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 139. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Brief for Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae at 4, 11). 
 140. Lower court judges have mirrored the Court’s rationale. In a recent case, the Eighth 
Circuit explained: “[W]e think the Constitution favors stricter recusal standards and fewer 
speech restrictions.” Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 841 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 141. In particular, the upper right box has caused the most concern. Although the judge 
in the lower left box wrongly recuses when there is no appearance of bias, most commentators 
today do not view this mistake as particularly problematic. This was not always so as courts had 
at one time held that it is “a judge’s duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified, but it is 
equally his duty to sit when there is no valid reason for recusation.” United States v. Edwards, 
334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 
F.2d 845, 860 (2d Cir. 1962), rev’d, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)). The duty to sit has now been 
abandoned for most state and federal judges. 
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Figure 1. 
 
Correct Decision
Appearance of Bias: Yes 
Recusal: Yes 
Wrong Decision
Appearance of Bias: Yes 
Recusal: No 
Wrong Decision 
Appearance of Bias: No 
Recusal: Yes 
Correct Decision
Appearance of Bias: No 
Recusal: No 
 
B. Why Recusal May Not Be the Solution 
In the following pages, I suggest that the underlying assumption 
that a correct recusal decision fully restores public confidence and 
entirely eliminates the appearance of bias may need to be 
reconsidered. This may be the case even when a judge correctly 
concludes (a) that his impartiality could reasonably be questioned 
and recuses, or (b) that his impartiality could not be questioned and 
declines to recuse. There are two reasons for this surprising assertion.  
1. Too little, too late 
The first reason why the “getting to recusal” approach fails to 
foster an appearance of impartiality is because the focus on 
appearances comes too late. Because appearances are considered only 
at the time of the final recusal decision, judges are free to engage in 
conduct that ultimately creates an appearance of partiality, and only 
then, once the appearance has been created, is the judge expected to 
recuse.142 This means that by the time the recusal decision is 
ultimately made and publicized, the public has already observed the 
conduct and the events that negatively affect its perception of the 
judiciary and formed its own, often negative, opinions about judicial 
impartiality. Recusal is intended as the solution to the problem; by 
requiring the judge to step aside, any appearance of impartiality is  
 
 
 142. It is important to highlight that the underlying conduct that is the focus of this 
Article is not improper by itself, as judicial codes already prohibit judges from engaging in such 
conduct. Rather, the problem arises only when a particular litigant, or a particular case, appears 
in front of the judge. 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 1:15 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
974 
thought to be eliminated and public confidence in the court 
restored. 
Research done by political scientists James Gibson and Gregory 
Caldeira suggests that things are not quite so simple.143 Gibson and 
Caldeira set out to study recusal’s effect on restoring the public’s 
confidence in the judgment of a particular case or in the judiciary 
itself. They used vignettes modeled after the facts in Caperton to 
determine whether citizens believed that “the recipient of the 
campaign support can serve as a fair and impartial judge and whether 
the West Virginia Supreme Court itself is a legitimate institution.”144 
Among the independent variables that Gibson and Caldeira 
manipulated was the judge’s recusal decision—did the judge step 
aside or did the judge cast his vote in the case despite the calls for 
recusal. The authors hypothesized, just as scholars and politicians for 
centuries had assumed, that “where a conflict of interest exists, 
recusal will rescue the legitimacy of the court.”145 
But this assumption turned out to be wrong, at least in part. 
Instead, the study revealed that the “effect of recusals is not to 
restore the court/judge to the level of support that exists when no 
conflict of interest is present.”146 That is, the recusal decision did not 
counteract the appearance of partiality that was created when a 
judicial candidate accepted contributions from a future litigant. This 
research confirms that the traditional assumption that recusals can 
neutralize conflicts of interests may not be entirely correct, and that 
“recusal is only a weak palliative for conflicts of interests created by 
contributions.”147 In other words, even when a judge on a multi- 
member court recuses, the public’s confidence in that court is only 
partially restored, and the public’s perception of partiality and bias is 
not completely erased.  
These results may be surprising to some, but they also make a 
great deal of sense. Sticking to the judicial election context, we know 
that campaign contributions have a negative effect on institutional 
 
 143. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, 
and Judicial Impartiality: Can the Legitimacy of Courts Be Rescued by Recusals?, (Oct. 19, 
2009) (on file with the author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428723 (follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink). 
 144. Id. at 11. 
 145. Id. at 13. 
 146. Id. at 32. 
 147. Id. at 3. 
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legitimacy.148 This concern is not without reason, since data suggest 
that judges are more likely to decide in favor of their contributor.149 
Furthermore, the public may be reasonably concerned that other 
contributions were made that simply have not yet come to light. It is 
much too optimistic, then, to expect that institutional legitimacy will 
be restored when apparently biased judges recuse themselves. To 
paraphrase Mr. Darcy, the public’s good opinion of the judiciary, 
once lost, is lost forever (or, at the very least, is not entirely restored 
by judicial recusal).150 In short, concentrating on the actual recusal 
decision in order to create or maximize the appearance of 
impartiality may make up only part of the picture, and our focus on 
appearances must come before the decision maker makes a recusal 
decision. 
To see how this problem operates in the real world, let us take a 
look at what circumstances may lead to the public’s loss of 
confidence in the judiciary. The trigger may be a judge’s interest in 
one of the parties or in a certain outcome in litigation, as it was in 
Tumey and Lavoie, or it may be the judge’s relationship with a 
litigant or an attorney for one of the parties, as it was in Caperton 
and the Scalia-Cheney duck hunting incident. An example of the 
former was recently on display in the challenge to the federal drilling 
moratorium in the wake of the BP disaster in the Gulf. Judge Martin 
Feldman, a U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana overturned a six-month moratorium on drilling that halted 
the approval of any new permits and suspended deep-water drilling 
at existing exploratory wells in the Gulf. It was later discovered that 
Judge Feldman held energy stocks in numerous drilling and offshore 
energy companies, including Transocean and Halliburton. After 
Judge Feldman failed to recuse himself, the case received significant 
media attention as numerous environmental groups sought 
recusal.151 But putting aside the judge’s recusal decision,152 the 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Shepherd, supra note 111. 
 150. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 94 (Patricia Meyer Spacks ed., 2010) (1813) 
(“My good opinion once lost is lost forever.”). 
 151. The Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Defenders of Wildlife 
were among the groups that sought Judge Feldman’s recusal. Tennille Tracy, Groups Seek 
Judge’s Removal in Drilling-Moratorium Case, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704293604575343361857605650.html. 
 152. In other words, let us assume that a reasonable person could question Judge 
Feldman’s impartiality and that recusal was indeed required by 28 U.S.C. § 455—a reasonable 
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relevant question for this Article is whether a different substantive 
recusal standard—or even a different recusal decision—would have 
restored public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. I 
believe the answer is “no.” 
When the federal drilling moratorium was litigated, the Los 
Angeles Times reported that  
[S]even of the 12 federal judges of the Eastern District of Louisiana 
already have cited potential conflicts of interest in bowing out of 
cases brought by fishermen, charter operators, tourist services and 
families of those killed in the April 20 explosion of the Deepwater 
Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico.153 
In the Fifth Circuit, it was discovered that most judges held some 
interest in oil companies, or had other close ties to the oil 
industry.154 As a result, recusals in cases involving the oil industry 
have become so common in the Fifth Circuit that the court was 
unable to reach a quorum to review a case brought by victims of 
Hurricane Katrina.155 It is precisely these types of interests that may 
create the impression of a biased and partial judiciary, and once the 
public has perceived judicial bias or a quid pro quo between a judge 
and a potential litigant, the recusal decision, no matter what the 
substantive standard and no matter what the decision, cannot fully 
restore the public’s confidence in the courts. 
The Gibson & Caldeira study is the first of its kind. Very little is 
known about how the recusal decision affects public perception of 
judicial impartiality. Because of the centuries-old assumption that 
recusal restores public confidence in the court, scholars have largely 
ignored this issue. My hope is that Gibson & Caldeira’s findings, 
together with this Article, will spur further study of how the public 
perceives judicial recusal decisions, and the extent to which even a 
correct recusal decision may still leave the reputation of the judiciary 
in doubt. 
 
assumption given the controversy that arose following Judge Feldman’s decision. 
 153. Carol J. Williams, Judges’ Hands Tied By Oil Industry Interests, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 
2010, at A2. 
 154. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL GUSHER: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S TIES TO OIL,  
http://www.afj.org/about-afj/press/fifth_circuit_judges_report.pdf (summarizing 
investments and interests of Fifth Circuit judges in the gas and oil industries) (last visited Aug. 
18, 2011). 
 155. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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2. One case at a time 
The second reason why focusing excessively on the substantive 
appearance-based recusal standard and considering appearance only 
at the time of the recusal decision fails to foster an appearance of 
impartiality is that one-time, one-off recusal decisions are not as 
effective in maximizing public confidence in the judiciary and the 
legitimacy of the courts as broad structural reforms. In a wide range 
of fields, scholars have observed that effective reform often requires 
structural changes rather than relying on favorable outcomes one 
case at a time.156 When recusal decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, 
public confidence in the judiciary is undermined. This is partly 
because the public does not know what led to a particular decision, 
and partly because, as discussed in greater detail below, the public 
only learns of a limited set of recusal decisions, which skews its 
perception.157 This is true even when the challenged judge properly 
assesses whether her impartiality may reasonably be questioned, and 
even when the judge ultimately recuses herself.  
It is generally understood that “[a]s a matter of legal technique, 
it is far preferable to have sound general principles rather than ad hoc 
rules, or even worse, a ‘myriad of single instances.’”158 But when it 
comes to recusal, ad hoc decisions are the norm, and each recusal 
decision becomes a one-time proposition, good for that day only. 
There is great variation from judge to judge in how they resolve 
recusal questions, and this variation not only leads to inconsistent 
results but also leads the public to question the fairness and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
Another reason why considering appearances on a case-by-case 
basis is problematic is that, at the point of recusal, judges generally 
know the parties, the lawyers, and the nature of the particular 
dispute from which they are asked to recuse. Of course, this 
information is not supposed to matter to the judge making the 
recusal decision, but it is hard to know whether it filters into judicial 
recusal analysis. For example, if the case involves a subject-matter 
close to the judge’s heart—let’s say the judge is particularly 
 
 156. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 25 (2008). 
 157. The public’s lack of knowledge is especially true because judges rarely publish an 
opinion explaining their recusal decision. 
 158. HAMMOND, supra note 116, at 6. 
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interested in expanding the scope of the First Amendment—there is 
a risk that the judge will decide not to recuse because she wants to 
cast a vote in the case, despite the fact that she may have a close 
relationship with one of the attorneys, or despite the fact that one of 
the litigants contributed heavily to her campaign. As Part IV argues 
below, the solution to this problem is that legislators must consider 
appearances ex ante, without knowing the particular circumstances in 
which recusal may arise in the future. 
Congress and the courts have acknowledged the importance of 
appearances when it comes to judicial legitimacy. Now, they must 
come to realize that structural problems should be remedied by 
large-scale systemic solutions, not in a case-by-case fashion.159 
Recusal statutes and judicial codes are unable to protect judicial 
legitimacy and the appearance of impartiality as long as the 
appearances are considered in an ad hoc fashion. In the recusal 
context in particular, there are two reasons why recusal decisions in 
individual cases do not create an appearance of impartiality: (1) the 
role of the media in publicizing non-recusal decisions, and (2) the 
difficulties inherent in the substantive recusal standard.  
 a. Judicial recusal and the media. The media plays an ever-
increasing and important role in the way the public perceives judicial 
disqualification and judicial impartiality. When it comes to judicial 
disqualification, only cases of non-recusal generally receive media 
scrutiny and public recognition. This is part of the reason why 
legislative and judicial reliance on judicial recusal decisions to create 
an appearance of impartiality, or even to eliminate the appearance of 
partiality, is misguided—when a judge steps aside, the public rarely 
knows it. 
One need only look at the controversies that have arisen in the 
last few years alone—Justice Scalia’s nonrecusal in the case involving 
Dick Cheney, Justice Benjamin’s nonrecusal in Caperton, and Judge 
Feldman’s nonrecusal in Hornbeck Offshore Services v. Salazar.160 But 
one is hard-pressed to identify any high-profile cases of recusal. This 
is because recusal often takes place under the radar, without an 
explanation or an opinion from the recusing judge, and without 
 
 159. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 80 (2009) (highlighting the difficulties inherent in the Court’s approach 
to addressing structural problems relating to judicial impartiality). 
 160. 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010). 
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media scrutiny. For example, decisions of the Supreme Court often 
indicate that one or more Justices did not participate in the case with 
a simple note that reads “Justice _______ did not participate in the 
decision.”161 Unlike the criticism and scrutiny that often accompanies 
nonrecusal decisions, these judicial recusals are generally ignored by 
the media and therefore cannot increase (or even affect) public 
perception of judicial impartiality. 
In the rare circumstances when judicial recusals (as opposed to 
nonrecusals) actually receive public scrutiny, the attention is 
generally negative, often focusing on the underlying judicial conduct 
that necessitated recusal in the first place. In other words, even when 
judges fully appreciate that their impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, their decision to recuse, just like their decision not to 
recuse, often is to the detriment of public confidence in the judiciary. 
This is because it highlights the conduct that created the appearance 
of impartiality in the first place. I touched on one example earlier in 
the Article: the media coverage of Fifth Circuit judges, and their 
frequent recusal in cases involving the oil industry. Despite judicial 
recusals in those cases, the reputation of the judiciary likely suffered 
from the disclosure that many, if not most, Fifth Circuit judges have 
connections to the oil and gas industry. 
Another prominent recent example of a recusal that received 
largely negative attention involved Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex 
Kozinski. In 2008, Judge Kozinski was presiding over an obscenity 
trial when it was reported that Kozinski’s personal website contained 
explicit pornographic material.162 When the reports became public, 
Judge Kozinski recused himself from the case. Following the recusal, 
the public commentary was overwhelmingly negative and critical of 
the judge, focusing on the underlying conduct rather than on the 
recusal decision itself. Here again, a recusal decision intended to 
create the appearance of impartiality and fairness potentially had the 
opposite effect.163 
 
 
 161. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 129 S. 
Ct. 2592 (2009) (in which Justice Stevens did not participate because he owns beachfront 
property in Florida). 
 162. Obscenity Trial Suspended After Judge Posts Sex Images Online, FOX NEWS, June 12, 
2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,365701,00.html. 
 163. Of course, this case is not typical and the salacious nature of the facts contributed to 
the negative publicity. 
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 Aside from the fact that nonrecusal decisions receive far greater 
public scrutiny and attention than recusal decisions, there is yet 
another reason why even a correct recusal decision, one that properly 
considers public perception and appearance, does not promote an 
appearance of impartiality. This is because the public’s perception of 
the underlying events is often skewed by the “lens of the media.” To 
apply the appearance-based disqualification test correctly under the 
federal disqualification statute (28 U.S.C. § 455) or the state judicial 
codes, a judge must determine whether an impartial and objective 
observer, knowing all the facts, might question the judge’s 
impartiality and reasonably perceive an appearance of bias. But the 
public rarely, if ever, has access to all the facts that underpin a recusal 
controversy. These facts are often complex and may involve long-
standing relationships between the judge and a litigant, or the judge 
and an attorney. While the superficial level of knowledge that the 
public may have perceived, or learned from media coverage, may 
lead a reasonable member of the public to question the judge’s 
impartiality, a greater understanding of the judiciary and the 
situation may negate any appearance of impropriety. 
As a result of this tension, the challenged judge may correctly 
determine that recusal is unnecessary because no reasonable person 
knowing all of the facts could question the judge’s impartiality, while 
at the same time the public perceives bias because it is basing its 
conclusions on a different set of facts.164 Once again, we may be left 
with a “correct” recusal decision that simultaneously damages the 
reputation of the judiciary and harms the appearance of impartiality.  
 
b. The appearances of appearances. Furthermore, in an ironic 
twist, the substantive appearance-based recusal standard itself may 
damage the reputation of the judiciary and minimize its legitimacy 
for two reasons.  
 
 164. This was the issue raised by Justice Scalia in his recusal memorandum following the 
duck hunting trip with Vice President Cheney. In seeking Scalia’s recusal, the Sierra Club 
argued that “[b]ecause the American public, as reflected in the nation’s newspaper editorials, 
has unanimously concluded that there is an appearance of favoritism, any objective observer 
would be compelled to conclude that Justice Scalia’s impartiality has been questioned.” 
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C.,  541 U.S. 913, 923 (2004). Justice Scalia identified 
numerous factual mistakes in the editorials and argued that the editorials should play no role in 
determining whether a reasonable observer would question Scalia’s impartiality. Id. at 924 
(“Such a blast of largely inaccurate and uninformed opinion cannot determine the recusal 
question.”). 
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First, an appearance-based substantive recusal standard may be 
inconsistent with the practice of judicial elections. Jed Shugerman 
suggests that a slightly ambiguous standard like the “appearance of 
bias” has an advantage insofar as it may lead judges to “err in favor 
of recusing themselves.”165 And it is undoubtedly true that some 
judges do err on the side of caution, and step aside simply to avoid 
any controversy even when they do not believe their partiality could 
reasonably be questioned. But, thirty-nine states elect some or all of 
their judges, and the public overwhelmingly prefers elected judges 
over appointed ones, despite concerns about bias towards campaign 
contributors.166 As Justice O’Connor explained in her concurrence in 
White, judges who must run for reelection “are likely to feel that 
they have at least some personal stake in the outcome of every 
publicized case.”167 Studies show that even minor contributions, even 
rejected contributions, may create an appearance of partiality 
requiring recusal.168 An aggressive recusal standard may defeat the 
very purpose of electing judges and could actually harm judicial 
legitimacy by depriving citizens of an opportunity to choose their 
judges for the cases that matter most.169  
There is another reason why the appearance-based recusal 
standard may itself be damaging to the public perception of the 
judiciary. The “appearance of bias” test is not a model of clarity and 
precision, with some commentators going so far as to call the 
standard unworkable at best, and a sham at worst.170 This problem 
becomes more acute as high-profile accusations of judicial bias and 
partiality become more and more common, as they have in the 
recent months. As the dissenters in Caperton argued, an increase in 
the number of allegations that judges are biased will further “erode 
 
 165. Shugerman, supra note 134, at 550. 
 166. James Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2006, THE BRENNAN 
CENTER FOR JUST. (2007), http://brennan.3cdn.net/49c18b6cb18960b2f9_z6m62gwji.pdf. 
 167. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 536, 788–89 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
 168. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 143. 
 169. A recent study showed that in 60 percent of the cases heard by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, “at least one of the litigants, attorneys, or firms involved had contributed to 
the election campaign of at least one justice.” Campaign Contributors and the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http://www.ajs.org/selection/jnc/docs/ 
AJS-PAstudy3-18-10.pdf (last updated 2009). 
 170. See Rotunda, supra note 117. 
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public confidence” in the fairness and integrity of the courts.171 
While these predictions may be overblown,172 one cannot help but 
wonder whether an expansive recusal standard and increased 
publicity for recusal motions may adversely affect the public 
perception of the judiciary by undermining confidence in the fairness 
and impartiality of the American judiciary. This is in part because it is 
so easy to allege an appearance of impropriety and so hard to 
determine whether there in fact is an appearance of impropriety. 
When recusal standards are too nebulous, and if allegations of an 
appearance of bias become the norm in litigation, recusal law 
becomes too vulnerable to manipulation and rather than furthering 
the appearance of impartiality, may only harm it. Additional research 
is necessary to confirm the suspicion that over-recusal, and excessive 
demands for recusal, can weaken the judiciary’s reputation. But at 
least one commentator suggests that this may indeed be the case.173 
IV. EX ANTE REGULATION AND RECUSAL PROCEDURE 
This Part proposes two changes to American recusal 
jurisprudence intended to increase public confidence in the 
impartiality of the courts and maximize judicial legitimacy. First, I 
will argue that when possible, ex ante regulation of judicial conduct 
that prevents the appearance of bias from arising in the first place 
would be the best method for creating and maintaining an 
appearance of judicial impartiality and fairness. Second, I propose 
that appearance-based regulation of recusal procedures may in fact 
do more to maximize the appearance of impartiality than the 
substantive recusal standards. 
A. Ex Ante Regulation of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Elections 
There is vast literature examining the tension between ex ante 
and ex post consideration in creating legal rules and standards. The 
advantage of an ex post approach is that it permits greater accuracy 
and tailoring while ex ante considerations often allow for greater 
clarity. But if it is true that recusal comes too late to restore public 
 
 171. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 172. See Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 60 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 229, 233–34 (2010). 
 173. Rotunda, supra note 117. 
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confidence in the judiciary once an appearance of bias has been 
created—if ex post recusal decisions are not the best way to 
“promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial 
process”174—then the most important recusal related jurisprudential 
changes are not actually changes to recusal rules at all. Rather, they 
are changes to other rules regulating judges—rules of judicial 
conduct and judicial selection—that explicitly consider how certain 
judicial behavior may influence the perception of judicial impartiality. 
For judicial regulation to truly have an effect on the appearance of 
impartiality, we must increase our regulation of the very conduct that 
creates the appearance problem in the first place, avoiding even the 
creation of an appearance of bias. In other words, when it comes to 
considering the appearance of impartiality and fairness, the best time 
to think about recusal is before the appearance of bias arises. 
By pushing back the time when appearances are considered we 
can avoid much of the damage that the judiciary suffers as a result of 
improper judicial conduct while eliminating the need for recusal 
rules and decisions to carry the heavy load of remedying the 
problem. Under the proposed ex ante regime, policymakers must do 
whatever possible to minimize the need for potential future recusals, 
as well as the number of calls for recusal. Implementation of better 
ex ante rules can reduce the number of future Caperton-like appeals 
and ease the dissenting Justices’ concerns that the Caperton decision 
will lead to a flood of new recusal motions. Greater ex ante 
regulation of judicial conduct and judicial elections also helps 
alleviate, if not eliminate, the “one case at a time” problem identified 
in Part III.B.2. While judges may not be in the best position to 
engage in the line drawing required in individual recusal cases, ex 
ante regulation allows the line drawing to be done on a general, 
systemic level by legislators or bar associations. In other words, 
adopting an ex ante approach to judicial recusal “eliminates the  
burden on judges to determine where the line for recusal is 
drawn.”175 
Furthermore, ex ante regulation of judicial conduct is preferable 
to ex post recusal-based regulation because the latter method misses 
 
 174. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988) (citing S. 
Rep. No. 93-419, at 5 (1973); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974)). 
 175. Symposium, Session 1: One Symptom of a Serious Problem: Caperton v. Massey, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 569, 587 (2010) (transcript of comments of Kathleen Sullivan). 
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the conduct that negatively affects the judiciary but that may never 
otherwise come to light. For example, in an election context, the 
losing candidate’s conduct may harm the reputation of the judiciary 
but would never be challenged on recusal. Likewise, recusal is not 
well designed to address a situation where a judge develops a 
relationship with a particular contributor, and while that particular 
contributor never appears as a litigant in front of the judge, making 
recusal unnecessary, the contributor may still have an interest in the 
outcome of other cases heard by the judge. This “different litigant, 
same interest” problem is extremely difficult to address with recusal 
but may still damage the appearance of judicial impartiality and harm 
the reputation of the judiciary. 
I propose four categories where ex ante rules could assist in 
avoiding damage to judicial legitimacy and the appearance of 
partiality. Within each category, I will discuss my proposed rule and 
provide an example of how the rule would operate in the context of 
recent recusal-related controversies: (1) judicial elections, (2) judicial 
friendships and relationships, (3) judicial financial interests, and (4) 
extrajudicial activities. 
1. Judicial elections 
 a. The problem. We start at the beginning of the judge’s career: 
judicial selection.176 The process by which a judge is selected is one 
of the key factors in the public’s perception of the courts.177 
especially important are the methods of judicial selection and the 
campaign environment.178 In fact, the element of judicial elections 
that has the greatest effect on the public’s perception of the judiciary 
is campaign fundraising.179 As mentioned earlier, the public’s 
concerns about the impartiality of judges receiving contributions 
from litigants are well founded. Recent studies confirm that judges 
 
 176. Of course, recusal may be necessary as a result of a judge’s conduct before judicial 
selection. For example, if a judge worked as a partner at a law firm before joining the bench, as 
many judges have, those friendships cannot be regulated by an ex ante scheme. Ex post recusal 
rules, like those contained in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) are intended to address these situations. 
 177. Cann & Yates, supra note 15, at 316. 
 178. Penny J. White, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to Supplement Inappropriate 
Voter Cues and Enhance Judicial Legitimacy, 74 MO. L. REV. 635, 645 (2009). 
 179. James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy 
Theory and “New-Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59, 69 (2008). 
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are more likely to rule for those who helped fund their campaigns.180 
Because ex post recusal cannot fully restore judicial legitimacy, it is 
important that we regulate conduct during judicial elections in order 
to avoid the harm in the first place. In other words, legislatures must 
regulate judicial elections to ensure that election-related practices 
and conduct do not damage the appearance of impartiality by 
pushing back the time frame for when we look at appearance—all the 
way back to the election itself.  
In Caperton, recusal was necessary because one of the litigants 
spent extravagant amounts of money to elect the very judge who 
would later rule on that litigant’s case.181 The damage to the 
reputation of the judiciary is done at this early stage. The very fact 
that a future or current litigant helps a judge get elected gives rise to 
the appearance of judicial bias and partiality.  
And Caperton does not present a unique fact pattern. Most 
judges in the United States stand for election and must raise the 
funds for their candidacies from the parties that they may eventually 
meet in the courtroom. For example, Avery v. State Farm Mutual 
Auto Insurance Company182 was a class action suit for breach of 
contract in which the plaintiffs alleged that State Farm violated its 
duty to restore automobiles to their original pre-crash condition by 
using automobile parts salvaged from other damaged vehicles.183 
After the lower courts found in favor of the plaintiffs, the Illinois 
Supreme Court reversed. Like Caperton, Avery was decided shortly 
after an election cycle for the Illinois Supreme Court. During his 
campaign for the court, Justice Lloyd Karmeier made numerous pro-
business statements.184 Karmeier also received over $350,000 in 
contributions from State Farm’s employees and its lawyers.185 After  
 
 
 180. Michael S. Kang & Joanna Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical 
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 69 (2011) 
(“[E]very dollar of direct contributions from business groups is associated with an increase in 
the probability that the judges will vote for business litigants.”). 
 181.  Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257. In sum, the litigant 
spent about three million dollars. 
 182. 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005). 
 183. Id. at 811. 
 184. See Goldberg et al., supra note 106, at 510. 
 185. Brief for 12 Organizations Concerned About the Influence of Money on Judicial 
Integrity, Impartiality, and Independence as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Avery v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 1003 (2006) (No. 05-842). 
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being elected to the bench, Justice Karmeier declined to recuse 
himself and cast the deciding vote in favor of the defendant. 
These two cases are just a small part of a larger problem. In fact, 
elected judges deciding cases involving their contributors has 
reached epidemic proportions. For example, a recent study showed 
that nearly two-thirds of cases heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court in 2008 and 2009 involved at least one party, lawyer, or law 
firm that contributed to the campaign of at least one of the 
justices.186  
In one word, the problem here is “money.”187 In response to 
Caperton, some states have begun to put in place ex post recusal 
reforms.188 But to really get at appearances of judicial partiality, states 
should create ex ante rules focusing on their election practices. 
 
b. The solution. What specific rules must be reformed? Most of 
the damage described above comes from judicial contributions and 
independent expenditures by individuals or groups that are likely to 
come in front of the elected judge as litigants. Therefore, legislators 
must better regulate the flow of money from contributors to judicial 
candidates by (1) eliminating or limiting direct contributions and 
independent expenditures for judicial elections altogether, (2) 
implementing a public financing scheme for judicial elections, or (3)  
requiring that all contributions to judicial candidates be 
anonymous.189 
 
 186. Malia Reddick & James R. DeBuse, Campaign Contributions and the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (Mar. 11, 2010), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/elert/campaign_contributions_and_the_pennsylvani
a_supreme_court/. 
 187. Bert Brandenburg, Big Money and Impartial Justice: Can They Live Together? 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 207, 217 (2010) (“Money is changing judicial elections and threatens to erode 
trust in the courts themselves.”). 
 188. See, e.g., New York’s new rule prohibiting elected judges from deciding cases 
involving litigants that had contributed $2,500 or more to their campaigns. See Rules 
Governing the Assignment of Cases Involving Contributors to Judicial Campaigns, RULES OF 
THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS § 151.1, available at 
http://nycourts.gov/rules/chiefadmin/151.shtml#section151_1. 
 189. This Article does not discuss the potential constitutional hurdles to regulating 
judicial campaign contributions. While these hurdles are real, their effect may be overstated. 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in White, commentators predicted that most regulation of 
judicial campaigns may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lower-level courts 
struck down a number of canons regulating candidates’ conduct in judicial elections. After 
Caperton, things may be looking up for supporters of regulation of judicial elections. See James 
Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 303–04 
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Requiring anonymous contributions is a particularly appealing 
proposal because such a requirement likely would not be subject to 
many of the constitutional objections that a proposal to eliminate or 
limit contributions altogether would be.190 It is difficult to 
understand why judges need to know the identity of their 
contributors, and why contributors must let judges know that they 
have contributed, other than to curry favor with the judges.191 A few 
states experimented with anonymous contributions for judicial 
elections in the 1970s, but the idea has not caught on.192 Today, this 
proposal may sound strange given the trend towards more 
disclosure, not less. But it is time for all states that elect judges to 
consider implementing this approach to combat the problem of 
judicial bias towards their contributors. 
Implementation of this proposal need not be overly complicated. 
Obviously, if judges were able to discover the identity of their 
contributors after the election, then the anonymity requirement 
would be futile. But it still seems likely that a successful anonymity 
scheme could be implemented. Perhaps the best approach was 
suggested by Ian Ayres and Jeremy Bulow, who proposed a similar 
regime that would operate through a privatized system of blind 
trusts.193 Under this regime campaigns could no longer accept 
contributions directly from individuals or companies. Rather, all  
 
 
 
(2010) (concluding that Caperton “provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform 
efforts”). In fact, Caperton’s apparent disregard of the infamous contribution/expenditure 
framework from Buckley v. Valeo suggests that states may regulate spending in judicial elections 
in ways that are otherwise impermissible in other elections. 
 190. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In the years since Buckley, there has 
been a tremendous amount of legal scholarship examining the question of whether money is 
speech. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Money Talks But It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953 
(2011); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
663, 688–89 (1997); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE 
L.J. 1001 (1976). 
 191. For an excellent discussion of potential ethical issues involved in attorney 
contributions to judges, see Keith Swisher, Legal Ethics and Campaign Contributions: The 
Professional Responsibility to Pay for Justice, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225 (2011). 
 192. See Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving 
Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 473 n.130 (1988) (noting that the ten 
adopting states were Arkansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming). 
 193. Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to 
Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 853 (1998). 
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donations to candidates (and political parties) would have to be 
made by mail to established blind trusts.194 
2. Judicial relationships 
 a. The problem. The second category that is a frequent source of 
recusal controversies is judicial relationships with friends. This can 
involve close friendships as well as romantic relationships with 
attorneys and litigants. Of course, these friendships are often 
unavoidable and cannot be prohibited outright. But particularly 
troublesome interactions between judges and their friends and 
colleagues should be regulated. 
One of the most famous recent incidents was Justice Scalia’s 
infamous duck-hunting trip with then-litigant Dick Cheney. After 
details of the trip came to light, calls for recusal reform grew to a 
fever pitch. The American Bar Association’s Joint Commission to 
Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct considered revisions 
to the judicial code, and two Democrats on the House Judiciary 
Committee called for hearings to amend federal recusal law. Then, as 
always, the focus was on the final recusal decision; namely, Justice 
Scalia’s decision that his impartiality could not reasonably be 
questioned. But, can we foster an appearance of impartiality when it 
comes to judicial friends through ex ante recusal reform? 
 b. The solution. There is little scholarship on regulation of judicial 
friendships,195 and even fewer rules regulating judges’ relationships 
with their friends and colleagues. What little scholarship exists 
supports the ex post “getting to recusal” approach that focuses on 
the substantive recusal rules (which I identified earlier).196 But, if our 
main goal is to maximize the appearance of judicial impartiality, then 
it is important to amend rules concerning friendships or interaction 
between judges and litigants rather than focusing on recusal alone. 
In other words, the ex ante rules that I propose do more to regulate 
the interaction between judges and litigants (or likely future  
 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. But see Jeremy M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification: The Need for a Per 
Se Rule on Friendship (Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPP. L. REV. 575, 584–614 (2006) (proposing 
a bright-line recusal rule for cases involving a judge’s close friends). 
 196. Id. 
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litigants) where interaction would create an appearance of partiality, 
even if the judge might eventually have an opportunity to recuse.  
For example, the rules of judicial conduct could be revised to 
prohibit any interaction between judges and current litigants, or 
litigants that are likely to appear in front of the judge within the next 
year. Admittedly, it is often difficult to predict which litigants will 
appear in front of the judge. Furthermore, it is important that judges 
remain active members of the community and participate in bar 
functions like Inns of Court. At the very least, however, when a party 
is litigating a case in the district court, the appellate judges likely to 
review any future appeal should refrain from interacting with that 
party until the case has concluded. This prophylactic measure is more 
likely to increase the appearance of impartiality and judicial 
legitimacy than asking the judge to recuse himself based on the 
appearance of impropriety. 
States should also consider implementing ex ante rules regulating 
certain types of friendships and relationships that should be 
prohibited outright. For example, judges should be prohibited from 
having romantic or sexual relationships with litigants that frequently 
appear in front of them.197 Just last year, a controversy broke out in 
Texas when a former judge and a former district attorney in Texas 
admitted that they had engaged in a lengthy affair. Both had 
participated in the trial of a man who was convicted of murder and 
sentenced to death.198 Similarly, a number of states have recently 
considered whether judges can be friends with lawyers on social 
networking sites like LinkedIn or Facebook.199  
While these regulations may seem simplistic, invasive, or perhaps 
downright silly, these are precisely the types of ex ante regulations 
that can prevent situations like Justice Scalia’s duck-hunting 
controversy from damaging the reputation of the judiciary. 
I do not propose that judges live in isolation, shielding 
themselves from any interaction with potential lawyers and litigants 
who may appear before them. Judicial selection mechanisms in the 
United States, whereby judges get to their position because of 
 
 197. Of course, this prohibition would not apply to judges who are married or related to 
those parties, but current recusal rules already require automated disqualification in those cases. 
 198. See Steve Mills, Judge’s Affair Complicates Death Row Case, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10, 
2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/10/nation/na-execution10. 
 199. John Schwartz, For Judges on Facebook, Friendship Has Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
2009, at A25. 
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contacts and friendships formed in school, private practice, and 
public service, do not permit such an approach.200 But when one 
litigant shares a close friendship or an intimate relationship with the 
judge, the appearance of impartiality suffers. Restricting these 
relationships while cases are pending is a reasonable burden. 
3. Judicial financial interests 
 a. The problem. American recusal law takes a hard-line approach 
to recusal when it comes to judges’ financial interests: a judge must 
recuse himself from a case if he has any financial interest in a litigant, 
even if the ownership interest is only a single share of stock.201 But 
again, this is an ex post rule; there is no ex ante prohibition on stock 
ownership in the first place. 
We saw an example of the problems with the ex post approach 
last summer when the Fifth Circuit failed to reach a quorum in a case 
because too many judges were required to recuse themselves.202 
Under the “getting to recusal” approach, the fact the judges recused 
themselves should eliminate any appearance of partiality. But this 
situation demonstrates why the ex post solutions alone are imperfect 
and insufficient. 
 b. The solution. If damage to the judiciary’s reputation cannot be 
remedied by recusal alone, then it is important to create ex ante rules 
about stock ownership or financial interest when parties (or those 
interests) are likely to come in front of the court. Rather than 
permitting stock ownership for any company or industry that the 
judge wants and then requiring recusal or divestment on the back 
end, judges should simply be prohibited from owning certain stock. 
It is not unreasonable to require that judges invest only in mutual 
 
 200. A federal judge famously quipped that a “U.S. District judge is someone who went 
to school with a future U.S. senator, and a U.S. Circuit judge is someone whose college 
roommate became a U.S. senator.” Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections: 
Maintaining Respectability in the Post-White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 3 (2005). 
 201. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2006). Generally, a computer program tracks judges’ stock 
ownership, and judges are automatically excluded from hearing cases involving corporations 
featured in judges’ investment portfolios. For a criticism of the rule, see Alex Kozinski, The 
Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1105 (2004) (“The idea that I would 
give up my honest judgment in a case for a few dollars is beyond silly—it’s ludicrous and 
insulting. So many of the things contained within the Canons, the ones most talked about, are 
wholly irrelevant in practice. They make no difference at all.”). 
 202. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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funds to ensure that their money is not closely tied to any particular 
company or industry.  
For example, an ex ante rule prohibiting judges in the Fifth 
Circuit from owning any direct interests in the oil industry would 
not unduly burden judges and would obviate the need for frequent 
recusals in cases that often come before the court. This would do 
much more for the appearance of fairness and the reputation of the 
judiciary than perpetual recusals. 
4. Extrajudicial involvement 
 a. The problem. Another problem is participation by judges in 
partisan activities that may create an impression that judges decide 
cases with an eye towards those partisan interests. Canon 4 of the 
Code of Conduct for United States Judges does not appear to 
prohibit this type of conduct.203 A recent example demonstrates this 
concern. 
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Citizens United,204 
reports surfaced that Justices Scalia and Thomas attended seminars 
and a political retreat sponsored by the energy giant and conservative 
bankroller Koch Industries. According to a Koch Industries mailing, 
the purpose of these retreats is to raise funds “to review strategies for 
combating the multitude of public policies that threaten to destroy 
America as we know it.”205 The seminar was held shortly before the 
case was added to the Supreme Court docket, but suggestions arose 
 
 203. Canon 4 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges reads: 
A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities, including law-related pursuits and 
civic, charitable, educational, religious, social, financial, fiduciary, and governmental 
activities, and may speak, write, lecture, and teach on both law-related and nonlegal 
subjects. However, a judge should not participate in extrajudicial activities that 
detract from the dignity of the judge’s office, interfere with the performance of the 
judge’s official duties, reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality, lead to frequent 
disqualification, or violate the limitations set forth below. 
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES canon 4 (2009). Although the second clause prohibits 
the judge from engaging in some extrajudicial activities if they “reflect adversely on the judge’s 
impartiality” or “lead to frequent disqualification,” this rule is rarely enforced, and judges 
generally decide for themselves whether their conduct runs afoul of the prohibition. Often, the 
judge’s impartiality cannot be questioned until a particular case arises. Moreover, as mentioned 
earlier, the Code of Conduct does not apply to Justices of the United States Supreme Court. 
See supra note 54. 
 204. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 205. Kate Zernike, Secretive Republican Donors Are Planning Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
20, 2010, at A18. 
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immediately that Scalia and Thomas’s ruling in Citizens United may 
have been affected by their time with Koch officials.206 Nothing is 
known about the discussions that took place at the seminar, but, as 
noted by Common Cause, the primary group that argued that Scalia 
and Thomas should have recused themselves, the ruling furthered 
the interests of Koch Industries.207 
 b. The solution. Because there are no clear rules in place to 
prevent judges from being associated, even closely associated, with 
people, politicians, or political activists, ex post recusal is generally 
considered the best, perhaps the only, solution to this kind of judicial 
conduct. This type of conduct can and should be regulated ex ante, 
before the reputation of the court suffers and judicial impartiality is 
questioned.208 
Just as with the regulation of judicial relationships and judicial 
financial holdings, judges should not be permitted to attend 
functions, retreats, or any other activities sponsored by groups with a 
direct stake either in pending litigation or in litigation that frequently 
arises in front of the court. Such flat bans may seem draconian, but, 
to the extent that they increase the appearance of judicial impartiality 
and independence, they are worth the effort. 
B. Recusal Procedures 
Regulation of the underlying judicial conduct and 
implementation of ex ante rules that prevent the appearance of 
impartiality or bias from arising in the first place is the best approach 
to maximize judicial legitimacy and public confidence in the courts. 
But sometimes it is impossible to prevent recusals altogether no 
matter how well-tailored our ex ante rules may be. For example, no 
amount of ex ante regulation can prevent recusal-related 
controversies when judges were personally involved in passing or 
 
 206. See Eric Lichtblau, Advocacy Group Says Justices May Have Conflict in Campaign 
Finance Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at A15. 
 207. Id. 
 208. It should be noted that, to the extent the conduct itself creates an appearance of 
impropriety or impartiality, such conduct is already prohibited by the Code of Conduct, at 
least for all judges other than members of the United States Supreme Court. See Neumann, 
supra note 57. The ex ante proposals in this Part, and throughout this paper, are intended to 
regulate conduct that does not create an appearance of impartiality until a particular case arises 
requiring recusal. 
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defending the very law in question.209 Furthermore, at least in the 
United States, judges become judges because of their relationships, 
friendships, and connections with influential political leaders and 
members of the community established over many years. Those 
connections and relationships cannot be prevented. Neither can 
judges erase years, sometimes decades, of other experience, including 
private practice and public service. It is precisely in these 
circumstances that recusal law must be at its strongest. 
An example of a situation where ex ante solutions are 
theoretically possible but practically infeasible occurs when it is not 
the judge’s previous conduct that leads to damage to the appearance 
of impartiality, but that of the judge’s spouse. Two recent recusal 
controversies illustrate this problem. 
First, Ninth Circuit judge Stephen Reinhardt was asked to recuse 
himself from hearing the appeal of a same-sex marriage case210 
because his wife, Ramona Ripston, the executive director of the 
ACLU of Southern California, was consulted about whether the case 
should have been brought in the first place.211 Appellants argued that 
Reinhardt must recuse himself because his “impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”212 Judge Reinhardt denied the motion.213 
Second, controversy has erupted over the activities of Virginia 
Thomas, the wife of Justice Clarence Thomas. After allegations that 
Mrs. Thomas has reported ties to anti-health care initiatives, House 
Democrats called for Justice Thomas to recuse himself from any legal 
challenge to the Affordable Care Act.214 Legal challenges to the Act 
have not yet reached the Supreme Court,215 and it is not yet known 
 
 209. During Elena Kagan’s confirmation hearings, for example, Justice Kagan was 
questioned about whether or not she would recuse herself from a likely Supreme Court 
challenge to the recently enacted health-care reform law. See Laura Meckler, Republicans Push 
Kagan on Health-Care Recusal, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704518904575364930042286638.html. 
 210. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 211. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 909, 911, 913 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 212. Id. at 916. 
 213. Id. at 911. 
 214. Letter from Anthony D. Weiner, Frank Pallone, Jr., Fortey Pete Stark, & 
Christopher S. Murphy, U.S. Cong., to Justice Clarence Thomas, Supreme Court (Feb. 9, 
2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/48573148/Letter-to-Justice-Thomas-
Asking-for-Recusal-In-Health-Law-Case. The letter was also partly spurred by Justice 
Thomas’s failure to disclose his wife’s receipt of substantial sums of money from the Heritage 
Foundation, a prominent opponent of health-care reform. Id. 
 215. District courts have split on the constitutionality of the Act. Compare Florida ex rel. 
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whether Justice Thomas will indeed recuse himself from hearing the 
case. 
One could imagine an ex ante proposal that prohibits spouses or 
family members from engaging in political or legal activity on issues 
likely to reach the judge. And one could certainly argue that the 
public can doubt the impartiality of a judge whose spouse has 
publicly participated either in the case itself, or in political activity 
surrounding the case. But such ex ante solutions are too draconian 
and overinclusive. Therefore, I limit my proposal to ex ante 
regulation of judicial conduct and judicial elections; familial speech 
or behavior should be excluded from regulation. 
1. (Non)history of recusal procedure 
An astute reader may have noticed something lacking in the 
historical discussion in Part II: there was no mention of recusal 
procedure either at the state or the federal levels. This absence is not 
an omission by the author; rather, it is a reflection of the apathy and 
neglect that disqualification procedures have received from 
legislatures and bar associations devising disqualification rules as well 
as the courts interpreting them. The federal disqualification statute216 
does not even provide a procedure for its enforcement. The same is 
true of the Model Judicial Code, which, like the federal statute, sets 
a substantive standard without a procedure for how that standard is 
to be enforced. Judges have generally made up the procedures ad 
hoc. One cannot review the history of procedural recusal law because 
none exists. 
This observation may be surprising given the great deal of public 
attention that recusal has received in the last few years as well as the 
number of amendments to the substantive recusal rules. Despite that 
attention, and despite those amendments, the recusal procedures 
have remained stagnant and are by far the least developed aspect of 
American recusal jurisprudence. Scholars have observed that 
“[u]nlike almost any other area of the law, the process by which 
 
Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 
285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (finding the Act unconstitutional), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 
1235 (11th Cir. 2011), with Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010) (upholding the Act as constitutional). The split is likely to reach the Court within 
the next couple of years. 
 216. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006). 
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judges decide whether to recuse themselves ignores the systems 
usually employed to resolve disputes in a fair and impartial 
manner.”217 
Procedurally, policymakers treat recusal the same way it was 
treated hundreds of years ago. The practice of self-recusal, a 
procedural quirk that allows the challenged judge to rule on her own 
recusal motion, has a long history in the common law. But this 
practice was created with virtually no discussion in British cases or 
scholarly literature before spreading, again with no critical analysis or 
discussion, to Australasia and the Americas. This common law 
recusal procedure survives to this day: the general practice in both 
state and federal courts is that the judge to whom the motion to 
recuse is directed decides whether his or her recusal is necessary.218 
And self-recusal is only one of the procedures that hearken back to 
Blackstone’s England. Judges rarely write opinions explaining their 
recusal decisions, and appellate courts rarely review those decisions 
with any vigor.219  
Procedures like self-recusal may have made sense when scholars 
and lawyers simply assumed that judges sworn to uphold justice 
could not and would not be biased.220 But as our understanding of 
human nature and the judiciary repudiated that presumption, and as 
social scientists uncovered the depths of potential subconscious bias, 
legislators and the courts should have reexamined recusal procedures 
like self-recusal.221 A system that relies on a sua sponte admission of 
bias, or even an appearance of bias, by a judge is bound to fail. 
Instead, various courts throughout the nation have adopted different 
approaches, resulting in a lack of uniformity.222 Some states permit a 
 
 217. Frost, supra note 43, at 536. 
 218. FLEMING JAMES JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 394 (5th ed. 2001). 
 219. Richard E. Flamm, History of and Problems with the Federal Judicial Disqualification 
Framework, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 760 (2010) (“[W]hile federal judges do recuse themselves 
in many situations, a judge who does so rarely writes an opinion explaining why.”). Because 
few opinions explaining the judge’s recusal rationale are published, the law of recusal is slow to 
develop and fails to provide any meaningful guidance to litigants and lawyers about when and 
whether disqualification is warranted in any particular case. 
 220. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *361 (“[T]he law will not suppose a possibility 
of bias or favor in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose 
authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.”). 
 221. See Bam, supra note 115, at 78–80 (discussing the importance of tailoring recusal 
procedures to the evolving substantive standards). 
 222. Leubsdorf, supra note 16, at 238. 
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judge whose recusal is sought to decide his own recusal motions, 
while others require somebody else to decide such motions.223 
More troubling is the fact that most states are silent on the 
subject, suggesting that recusal procedure is no more than an 
afterthought if it is a thought at all.224 And even when states get 
around to considering recusal procedure, the movements generally 
have little success. In the last decade, four states sought to amend 
their recusal rules to require that a judge other than the judge whose 
recusal is sought rule on each motion. 225 All four efforts failed.226  
Why is recusal procedure almost entirely ignored by Congress 
and state legislatures? One explanation may be that process is viewed 
as minutiae, unworthy of legislative attention. After all, procedural 
law has been described by some as “painstaking, ministerial, and 
ultimately boring.”227 Additionally, Congress has generally been 
cautious in regulating judicial procedures in order to protect judicial 
impartiality and maintain separation of powers.228 Moreover, it is 
(wrongly) assumed that procedural issues should be left to judges, 
since that is what judges presumably do best. Surely, one may think, 
judges can create recusal procedures that fairly implement the 
substantive rules that are in place. Part of the explanation for this 
belief lies in the underlying assumption, discussed and challenged in 
Part III, that so long as the judge ultimately reaches the correct 
recusal decision, nothing else, including the procedure used to reach 
the decision, particularly matters. 
And even when scholars consider recusal procedure, it is only as a 
means to an end—the end being, once again, the correct recusal 
 
 223. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.3(c)(5) (West 2006). 
 224. See William E. Raftery, “The Legislature Must Save the Court from Itself”?: Recusal, 
Separation of Powers, and the Post-Caperton World, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 765, 766–67 (2010) 
(listing the states that do not set forth any recusal procedure for consideration of recusal 
motions). 
 225. Id. at 772–73. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Joachim Zekoll, Comparative Civil Procedure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 1327–28 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
 228. Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a 
Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1555 (2008) (“The procedure/merits line also rides 
on strong separation of powers concerns, dividing the respective lawmaking capacities of 
Congress and the courts.”). Scholars have criticized the shortcomings in a system of judicial 
self-discipline in other contexts. See, e.g., Lara A. Bazelon, Putting the Mice in Charge of the 
Cheese: Why Federal Judges Cannot Always Be Trusted to Police Themselves and What Congress 
Can Do About It, 97 KY. L.J. 439 (2009). 
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decision. In other words, when recusal procedure receives any 
attention, it is generally part of the critique of the outcomes rather 
than the appearances created by the procedures themselves. For 
example, other scholars have attacked the practice of self-recusal on 
the grounds that judges may not appreciate the presence of 
subconscious bias, which leads them to under-recuse.229 To the 
contrary, I argue that procedures themselves are the ends—it is in 
setting recusal procedures that we should be thinking about 
appearances, not hoping that procedures will lead to a substantive 
result that will create an appearance of impartiality. 
2. The importance of procedure 
Why might an appearance-based recusal procedure be more 
effective in creating an appearance of an impartial judiciary than the 
current outcome-based recusal model? Research by social scientists 
holds the key.230 This research supports the notion that the public’s 
perception of the judiciary is influenced in large part by whether the 
judicial process is perceived to be procedurally fair.231 In fact, several 
scholars have shown that even when a court’s substantive decisions 
are disfavored, courts retain their perceived legitimacy so long as the 
decisions were reached in a procedurally fair manner.232 These 
 
 229. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 54, at 1242; Steven Lubet, It Takes a Court, 60 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 221, 228 (2010) (“When it comes to disqualification, it takes more than a 
single judge to render a fair decision.”). Of course, judges are at times self-aware of the 
possibility of subconscious bias. One of the all-time famous Supreme Court recusals happened 
in Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollak when Justice Frankfurter 
recused himself because of his objection to the playing of radios on public buses. 343 U.S. 
451, 454 (1952) (“[N]either the operation of the service [of playing the radio on public 
buses] nor the action of the Commission [in] permitting its operation is precluded by the 
Constitution.”). In his memorandum explaining the recusal decision, Frankfurter said that his 
subconscious hatred of the radio on public buses was so strong that his “unconscious feelings” 
could influence his resolution of the dispute. Id. at 466–67. 
 230. James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural 
Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 471 (1989); Tom R. Tyler & 
Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular 
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 621, 621–22 (1991). 
Much of the literature in this field focuses on the United States Supreme Court but likely 
applies equally to other institutions, including lower-level federal courts and state courts. 
 231. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 1–2 (1988). 
 232. Gibson, supra note 230, at 471; Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and 
the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and 
Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 734 (1994). 
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findings are especially true for an institution where the decision 
makers are appointed rather than elected and are independent from 
the public rather than accountable to their constituents.233 
Because procedural fairness is indeed crucial to public 
perception, ignoring recusal procedures is a fatal mistake, at least so 
long as recusal aims to create an appearance of impartiality. And if 
outcomes matter less than process, then leaving aside all 
consideration of appearances until the judge makes the final recusal 
decision, rather than establishing a proper appearance-based recusal 
procedure, misses the boat entirely. 
Taking appearances seriously, therefore, means that reforming 
the recusal procedures should be a top priority. Only such large-scale 
structural changes can create an appearance of fairness and 
impartiality. Implementing proper procedures can legitimize judicial 
institutions that often operate in an independence-based model. For 
example, procedural changes requiring judges to explain their recusal 
decisions would foster judicial accountability by giving the public 
greater access to—and understanding of—judicial recusal 
decisions.234 It would also require judges to be more thoughtful in 
decisions they have to justify publicly. Americans have great faith in 
the courts in large part because they believe they get a fair shot and a 
fair resolution. In the context of recusals this means that we should 
create procedures that reduce the appearance of partiality and 
reassure Americans that recusal decisions are made in a way that 
fosters impartiality and independence. 
The question of what specific procedures are necessary to create 
the appearance of impartiality is difficult to answer without empirical 
studies. However, political scientists have identified four essential 
elements contributing to the perception of procedural fairness.235 
First, litigants must be treated with dignity and respect.236 Second, 
parties must have the opportunity to participate in the process.237 
 
 233. John R. Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
657, 682 (1994); Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
312, 314–315 (1997). 
 234. Cf. Roberts, supra note 54, at 121 (discussing how the lack of clear recusal 
procedures in the United States Supreme Court “permits unaccountability, and increases 
doubts about appearances of impartiality”). 
 235. Tom R. Tyler, What Do They Expect?: New Findings Confirm the Precepts of 
Procedural Fairness, CAL. CTS. REV., Winter 2006, at 22–23. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. 
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Third, judges must be trustworthy, and, fourth, the judiciary must 
be neutral.238 These recommendations mirror, in some respects, 
those of the widely respected Legal Process Theory developed by 
Hart and Sacks.239 They identified five central procedural elements: 
(1) litigants must initiate disputes, (2) an adversarial process must 
allow each party to advance its position, (3) the court must provide a 
rationale for its decision, (4) the decision itself must be supported by 
a body of law, and (5) the decision maker must be impartial.240 
Some have argued that all of the elements identified by Hart and 
Sacks should be imported to the American recusal framework in 
toto.241 For example, Amanda Frost suggests that because these 
tenets of adjudication “serv[e] a vital legitimating function,” they 
should all be “incorporate[d] into recusal law.”242 There is some 
merit to this proposal; after all, if those are all essential ingredients in 
a legal system, why not incorporate them into our recusal 
jurisprudence?  
But while the five Legal Process tenets identified above are 
essential for legitimizing judicial decisions, they may not all be 
necessary (or even advantageous) in creating an appearance of 
impartiality, and some may even undermine that goal. For example, 
the adversarial process is a key part of the American legal system, 
allowing both parties an opportunity to present their conflicting 
arguments. This party control over case presentation serves a 
legitimizing function. But importing the adversarial model into 
recusal jurisprudence may in fact harm the appearance of judicial 
impartiality by requiring that judges (or their representatives) argue 
their cases and attempt to prove to some neutral arbiter that they are 
not biased and that their earlier conduct was not improper. Pitting 
judges against litigants may in fact work to the detriment of 
appearances.243 
 
 
 238.  Id. 
 239. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (2001). 
 240.  Id. 
 241. Frost, supra note 43, at 555–56. 
 242. Id. at 535. 
 243. Judges are often frustrated by what they perceive as frivolous recusal requests, and 
this problem would be exacerbated if judges were forced to defend themselves in a proceeding 
from such charges. 
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Therefore, this Article suggests a modified, appearance-based 
process theory, whereby those procedures that would appear to a 
reasonable person as necessary to create a fair recusal scheme would 
be implemented. In other words, rather than asking what procedures 
foster confidence in the correctness of the final decision, we should 
ask what procedures create an appearance of impartiality. This would 
require empirical studies designed to learn which aspects of the Legal 
Process Theory matter most for the purpose of appearances. For 
example, it seems that Legal Process Theory elements three, four, 
and five, which require that an impartial decision maker provide a 
rationale for its decision in a written opinion that must be supported 
by a body of law, would likely be the crucial elements that must be 
imported into recusal procedures. Elements one and two, that 
litigants must initiate disputes and an adversarial process must allow 
each party to advance its position, however, may or may not be 
necessary; this should be confirmed using social science data. 
The specific determinations, however, need not, and cannot, be 
made at this point. The biggest procedural hurdle to the appearance 
of fairness, and one that must likely be addressed first, is the dubious 
practice of self-recusal. One of the most important procedural 
questions when it comes to recusal is the question of who should 
decide recusal motions: the impugned judge, another judge of the 
same court, a group of judges, or some other party. The issue of self-
recusal has been perhaps the most criticized aspect of American 
recusal rules and procedures.244 When one looks at recusal procedure 
from the appearance-based perspective, the flaws inherent in a system 
where a potentially biased judge is assigned the task of ruling on her 
own recusal motion become immediately apparent. First, the self-
recusal procedure violates the fundamental principle that one should 
not be a judge in her own cause. Furthermore, the practice leads 
attorneys to abstain from making a recusal motion because of a fear 
of judicial retribution. Finally, a judge deciding her own recusal 
motion may not acknowledge that she is biased, either because she 
does not recognize the bias, because she does not want to admit that 
 
 244. See SHAMAN & GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 105, at 66–67; Leslie W. Abramson, 
Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 543, 561 (1994) (“The 
appearance of partiality and the perils of self-serving statutory interpretation suggest that, to 
the extent logistically feasible, another judge should preside over such motions.”); David K. 
Stott, Comment, Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality Through 
Recusal Reform, 2009 BYU L. REV. 481, 500. 
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she is biased, or because she does not want to admit that she 
engaged in conduct that created the appearance of bias. 
There is another advantage to focusing on appearances while 
setting recusal procedures rather than leaving the appearance inquiry 
until the very end when the judge makes her recusal decision. It is 
the advantage of time—there is an opportunity to think about and 
conduct empirical research into what procedures create an 
appearance of impartiality, as opposed to when the case is already in 
front of the judge. When appearances are considered in creating 
recusal procedures, the burden of setting clear, consistent, and 
appearance-based recusal procedures will fall to state and federal 
legislatures.245 Judges are generally too hesitant to impose 
procedures that threaten the collegial relations with their colleagues. 
Judges rarely criticize a colleague for being biased or prejudiced, 
although they have anonymously acknowledged that their colleagues 
(but not them!) may be biased in favor of some litigants, especially 
those who helped them get elected.246 
Furthermore, considering appearances ex ante, before any case is 
actually pending, eliminates the opportunity for judges to consider 
the facts of the case in reaching a recusal decision. Once the decision 
maker knows the legal issue in question or the identities of the 
parties, she may under- (or over-) appreciate whether her impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned. For example, a judge may be 
tempted to refuse to recuse herself in a case involving a cause 
important to the judge (for example, tort reform for a conservative 
judge or abortion for a liberal one). But if legislatures consider 
appearances in advance and implement appearance-based recusal 
procedures, it may be more difficult for the underlying facts of the 
dispute to infiltrate the recusal decision. 
More importantly, just as I questioned the wisdom of allowing 
judges to apply the “reasonable person” standard to test the 
appearance of their own conduct, judges are likewise not well-suited 
to set procedures for determining whether their own impartiality is 
in question. This is in part because judges do not have the means 
that legislators have to determine which procedures create an 
appearance of impartiality. Judges have their own interests in mind, 
 
 245. See Raftery, supra note 224, at 766 (discussing the role that legislatures can and 
should play in drafting recusal statutes and crafting recusal mechanisms). 
 246. Pozen, supra note 110, at 290–91. 
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and these interests often conflict with creating a recusal procedure 
that avoids the appearance of bias. Judges should neither be setting 
the recusal procedures nor applying the recusal standards to 
themselves. In fact, to the extent that judges do have control over 
either the recusal process or the outcome, they are not likely to 
appear impartial.247 
I conclude this Part by returning to the discussion of the 
substantive recusal standard and by reconsidering what the 
substantive recusal standard should entail. Earlier, I argued that the 
appearance-based standard in place now is not by itself sufficient to 
create an appearance of impartiality. But that, of course, is not an 
argument in favor of scrapping the standard altogether. Rather, I 
believe legislatures must consider the substantive recusal standard 
just as they would recusal procedures and determine what standard is 
likely to foster an appearance of fairness. One should not assume that 
an appearance-based standard is best for appearances. As mentioned 
earlier, by lowering the threshold that parties must meet to obtain 
recusal, more recusal motions will be filed and public confidence in 
the courts may suffer.248 Ultimately, just as the legislatures will need 
to determine which recusal procedures create an appearance of 
impartiality, they will also need to decide what substantive recusal 
standard is best for judicial legitimacy and the reputation of the 
courts. 
 
 247. One solution would be to create an independent office to review recusal-related 
decisions. The 112th Congress has suggested the creation of an Inspector General for the 
judicial branch. Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2011, H.R. 727, 112th 
Cong. § 1021 (1st Sess. 2011). Although the office is intended to investigate misconduct and 
prevent “waste, fraud, and abuse” within the judiciary, an additional option may be to give it 
the power to review recusal decisions by federal judges. Id. § 1023(3). This procedural change 
may instill confidence in the public that judges are accountable for their recusal decisions. 
 248. For example, in a recent West Virginia case, a litigant sought state supreme court 
justice Menis Ketchum’s recusal based on statements that he made in his election campaign. 
Jessica M. Karmasek, Ketchum Reverses Course, Recuses Himself, W. VA. REC., Sept. 28, 2010, 
available at http://www.wvrecord.com/news/230005-ketchum-reverses-course-recuses-
himself. After the judge denied the recusal motion, somebody leaked the decision to legal 
blogs, creating even greater controversy and drawing negative attention and publicity to the 
West Virginia courts. Id. This publicity ultimately led Justice Ketchum to recuse himself not 
because he believed his continued presence on the case violated the appearance of impartiality, 
but rather because he did not “want [the] Court to be publicly maligned.” Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Recusal lies at the heart of our understanding of the role of the 
courts in a democracy. It is meant to ensure judicial independence 
and impartiality and to protect the legitimacy of the courts as well as 
the reputation of the judiciary. Without reforms to various aspects of 
recusal law, public confidence in the judiciary—the primary source of 
judicial legitimacy—will continue to wane.  
This Article suggests that the long-standing assumption that 
recusal completely restores the appearance of judicial impartiality and 
public confidence in the courts may need reexamination. It is time to 
focus on the circumstances that lead to recusal as well as recusal 
procedures. By shifting the focus away from the substantive recusal 
standard and the actual recusal decision, we can begin to maximize 
the appearance of impartiality on a systemic basis. And by 
considering appearance ex ante, before problems arise, we can put in 
place ethics rules and recusal procedures that truly legitimize the 
judiciary and restore the people’s faith in the fairness of the American 
courts. 
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